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Abstract
Roles in cryptographic protocols do not always have a linear execution,
but may include choice points causing the protocol to continue along dif-
ferent paths. In this paper we address the problem of representing choice
in the strand space model of cryptographic protocols, particularly as it is
used in the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis tool.
To achieve this goal, we develop and give formal semantics to a pro-
cess algebra for cryptographic protocols that supports a rich taxonomy
of choice primitives for composing strand spaces. In our taxonomy, de-
terministic and non-deterministic choices are broken down further. Non-
deterministic choice can be either explicit, i.e., one of two paths is chosen,
or implicit, i.e., the value of a variable is chosen non-deterministically.
Likewise, deterministic choice can be either an explicit if-then-else choice,
i.e., one path is chosen if a predicate is satisfied, while the other is chosen
if it is not, or implicit deterministic choice, i.e., execution continues only
if a certain pattern is matched. We have identified a class of choices which
includes finite branching and some cases of infinite branching, which we
address in this paper.
We provide a bisimulation result between the expected forwards ex-
ecution semantics of the new process algebra and the original symbolic
backwards semantics of Maude-NPA that preserves attack reachability.
We have fully integrated the process algebra syntax and its transforma-
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tion into strands in Maude-NPA. We illustrate its expressive power and
naturalness with various examples, and show how it can be effectively used
in formal analysis. This allows users to write protocols from now on using
the process syntax, which is more convenient for expressing choice than
the strand space syntax, in which choice can only be specified implicitly,
via two or more strands that are identical until the choice point.
1 Introduction
Formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has become one of the most successful
applications of formal methods to security, with a number of tools available and
many successful applications to the analysis of protocol standards. In the course
of developing these tools it has become clear that there are certain universal
features that can best be handled by accounting for them directly in syntax
and semantics of the formal specification language, e.g., unguessable nonces,
communication across a network controlled by an attacker, and support for the
equational properties of cryptographic primitives. Thus a number of different
languages have been developed that include these features.
At the same time, it is necessary to provide support for more commonly
used constructs, such as choice points that cause the protocol to continue in
different ways, and to do so in such a way that they are well integrated with
the more specifically cryptographic features of the language. However, in their
original form most of these languages do not support choice, or support it only
in a limited way.
In particular the strand space model [Fabrega et al(1999)], one of the most
popular models designed for use in cryptographic protocol analysis, does not
support choice in its original form; strands describe linear sequences of input
and output messages, without any branching. One response to dealing with
this limitation, and to formalizing strand spaces in general has been to embed
the strand space model in some other formal system that supports choice, e.g.,
event-based models for concurrency [Crazzolara and Winskel(2002)], Petri nets
[Fro¨schle(2009)], or multi-set rewriting [Cervesato et al(2000)]. However, we
believe that there is an advantage in introducing choice in the strand space
model itself, while proving soundness and completeness with another formal
system in order to validate the augmented model. This allows us to concentrate
on handling the types of choice that commonly arise in cryptographic protocols.
A detailed discussion of related work can be found at Section 11.
1.1 Contributions
This paper is an extended version of the conference paper [Yang et al(2016)].
We address the problem of representing choice in the strand space model, par-
ticularly as it is used in the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis tool.
We have identified a class of choices which includes finite branching and some
cases of infinite branching. At the theoretical level, we provide a bisimulation
result between the expected forwards execution semantics of the new process
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algebra and the original symbolic backwards semantics of Maude-NPA. This re-
quires extra intermediate forwards and backwards semantics that are included
in this paper, together with all the proofs, but were not included in the con-
ference paper [Yang et al(2016)]. What these results make possible is a sound
and complete symbolic reachability analysis method for cryptographic protocols
with choice modulo equational properties of the cryptographic functions satis-
fying the finite variant property (FVP) (see [Escobar et al(2017)] for a detailed
explanation of how FVP theories are supported in Maude-NPA). At the tool
level, we have fully integrated the process algebra syntax, and its transformation
into strands, and have developed new methods to specify attack states using the
process notation in the recent release of Maude-NPA 3.0 (see Section 10.1, and
[Escobar et al(2017)]). None of this was available at the time of the conference
paper [Yang et al(2016)]. Furthermore, we illustrate the expressive power and
naturalness of adding choice to strand spaces with various examples, and show
how it can be effectively used in formal analysis.
1.2 Choice in Maude-NPA
Previous to this work, Maude-NPA offered some ways of handling choice, but
its scope was limited, and a uniform semantics of choice was lacking. Sev-
eral kinds of branching could be handled by a protocol composition method in
which a single parent strand is composed with one or more child strands. Al-
though protocol composition is intended for modular construction of protocols,
with suitable restrictions it can also be used to express both non-deterministic
branching and deterministic branching predicates on pattern matching of out-
put parameters of the parent with the input parameters of the child. However,
repurposing composition to branching has its limitations. First of all, it is possi-
ble to inadvertently introduce non-deterministic choice into what was intended
to be deterministic choice by unwise choice of input and output parameters.
Secondly, the limitation to pattern matching rules out certain types of deter-
ministic choice conditioned on predicates that cannot be expressed this way,
e.g., disequality predicates. Finally, implementation of choice via composition
can be inefficient, since Maude-NPA must evaluate all possible child strands
that match a parent strand.
Maude-NPA, in common with many other cryptographic protocol analysis
tools, also offers a type of implicit choice that does not involve branching: non-
deterministic choice of the values of certain variables. For example, a strand that
describes an initiator communicating with a responder generally uses variables
for both the initiator and responder names; this represents a non-deterministic
choice of initiator responder identities. However, the semantic implications of
this kind of choice were not that well understood, which made it difficult to
determine where it could safely be used. Clearly, a more unified treatment of
choice was necessary, together with a formal semantics of choice.
In support of this work we have developed a taxonomy of choice in which the
categories of deterministic and non-deterministic choice are further subdivided.
First of all, non-deterministic choice is subdivided into explicit and implicit non-
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deterministic choice. In explicit non-deterministic choice a role1 chooses either
one branch or another at a choice point non- deterministically. In implicit non-
deterministic choice a logical choice variable is introduced which may be non-
deterministically instantiated by the role. Deterministic choice is subdivided
into (explicit) if-then-else choice and implicit deterministic choice. In if-then-
else choice a predicate is evaluated. If the predicate evaluates to true one branch
is chosen, and if it evaluates to false another branch is chosen. Deterministic
choice with more than two choices can be modeled by nesting of if-then-else
choices. In implicit deterministic choice, a term pattern is used as an implicit
guard, so that only messages matching such pattern can be chosen i.e., accepted,
by the role. Although implicit deterministic choice can be considered a special
case of if-then-else choice in which the second branch is empty, it is often simpler
to treat it separately. Classifying choice in this way allows us to represent all
possible behaviors of a protocol by a finite number of strands modeling possible
executions, while still allowing the variables used in implicit non-deterministic
and deterministic choice to be instantiated in an infinite number of ways.
1.3 A Motivating Example
In this section we introduce a protocol that we will use as a running example.
It is a simplified version of the handshake protocol in TLS 1.3 [Rescorla(2016)],
a proposed update to the TLS standard for client-server authentication. This
protocol, like most other protocol standards, offers a number of different choices
that are applied in different situations. In order to make the presentation and
discussion manageable, we present only a subset here: the client chooses a Diffie-
Hellman group, and proposes it to the server. The server can either accept it
or request that the client proposes a different group. In addition, the server
has the option of requesting that the client authenticates itself. We present the
protocol at a high level similar to the style used in [Rescorla(2016)].
Example 1.1. We let a dashed arrow 99K denote an optional message, and an
asterisk * denote an optional field.
1. C Ñ S : ClientHello, Key Share
The client sends a Hello message containing a nonce and the Diffie-Hellman
group it wants to use. It also sends a Diffie-Hellman key share.
• 1.1 S 99K C : HelloRetryRequest
The server may optionally reject the Diffie-Hellman group proposed
by the client and request a new one.
• 1.2 C 99K S : DHGroup, Key Share
The client proposes a new group and sends a new key share.
1As further explained later, the behaviors of protocol participants, e.g., sender, receiver,
server, etc., are described by their respective roles. Since a protocol may have multiple sessions,
various participants, called principals, may play the same role in different sessions.
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2. S Ñ C : ServerHello, Key Share,
{AuthReq*},{CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
The server sends its own Hello message and a Diffie-Hellman key share. It
may optionally send an AuthReq to the client to authenticate itself with a
public key signature from its public key certificate. It then signs the entire
handshake using its own public key in the CertificateVerify field. Finally,
in the Finished field it computes a MAC over the entire handshake using
the shared Diffie-Hellman key. The tu notation denotes a field encrypted
using the shared Diffie-Hellman key.
3. C Ñ S : tCertificateVerify*u, tFinishedu
If the client received an AuthReq from the server it returns its own Cer-
tificateVerify and Finished fields.
1.4 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in Section
2 and a high level introduction of the Maude-NPA tool in Section 3, we first
define the process algebra syntax and operational semantics in Section 4. In
Section 5 we extend Maude-NPA’s strand space syntax to include choice oper-
ators. The main bisimulation results between the expected forwards semantics
of the process algebra in Section 4 and the original symbolic backwards strand
semantics of Maude-NPA of Section 3 are Theorems 4 and 5. They are proved
by introducing an intermediate semantics, a forward strand space semantics
originally introduced in [Escobar et al(2014)]. First, in Section 5 we extend
the strand space model with constraints, since strands are the basis of both
the forwards semantics and the backwards semantics of Maude-NPA. In Sec-
tion 6 we augment the forwards strand space semantics of [Escobar et al(2014)]
with choice operators and operational semantic rules to produce a constrained
forwards semantics. In Section 7 we prove bisimilarity of the process algebra
semantics of Section 4 and the constrained forwards semantics of Section 6.
In [Escobar et al(2014)] the forwards strand space semantics was proved sound
and complete w.r.t. the original symbolic backwards semantics of Maude-NPA
and, therefore, such proofs had to be extended to handling constraints. In Sec-
tion 8 we augment the original symbolic backwards semantics of Maude-NPA
with choice operators and operational semantic rules to produce a constrained
backwards semantics. In Section 9 we then prove that the constrained backwards
semantics is sound and complete with respect to the constrained forwards se-
mantics. By combining the bisimulation between the process algebra and the
constrained forwards semantics on the one hand (Theorem 1) and the bisimula-
tion between the constrained forwards semantics and the constrained backwards
semantics on the other hand (Theorems 3 and 2) we obtain the main bisimu-
lation results (Theorems 4 and 5). Finally, in Section 10 we describe how the
process algebra has been fully integrated into Maude-NPA and show some ex-
periments we have run using Maude-NPA on various protocols exhibiting both
deterministic and non-deterministic choice. In Section 11 we discuss related and
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future work, in particular the potential of using the process algebra syntax as a
specification language. Finally, we conclude in Section 12.
2 Preliminaries
We follow the classical notation and terminology for term rewriting and for
rewriting logic and order-sorted notions, see [Meseguer(1992)]. We assume an
order-sorted signature Σ “ pS,ď,Σq with poset of sorts pS,ďq. We also assume
an S-sorted family X “ tXsusPS of disjoint variable sets with each Xs countably
infinite. T
Σ
pX qs is the set of terms of sort s, and TΣ,s is the set of ground terms
of sort s. We write T
Σ
pX q and T
Σ
for the corresponding order-sorted term
algebras. For a term t, Varptq denotes the set of variables in t.
A substitution σ P SubstpΣ,X q is a sorted mapping from a finite subset of
X to T
Σ
pX q. Substitutions are written as σ “ tX1 ÞÑ t1, . . . , Xn ÞÑ tnu where
the domain of σ is Dompσq “ tX1, . . . , Xnu and the set of variables introduced
by terms t1, . . . , tn is written Ranpσq. The identity substitution is denoted
id. Substitutions are homomorphically extended to T
Σ
pX q. The application
of a substitution σ to a term t is denoted by tσ. For simplicity, we assume
that every substitution is idempotent, i.e., σ satisfies Dompσq X Ranpσq “ H.
This ensures tσ “ ptσqσ. The restriction of σ to a set of variables V is σ|V .
Composition of two substitutions σ and σ1 is denoted by σσ1. A substitution σ
is a ground substitution if Ranpσq “ H.
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t “ t1, where t, t1 P T
Σ
pX qs for some sort
s P S. Given Σ and a set E of Σ-equations, order-sorted equational logic induces
a congruence relation “E on terms t, t
1 P T
Σ
pX q. The E-equivalence class of
a term t is denoted by rtsE and TΣ{EpX q and TΣ{E denote the corresponding
order-sorted term algebras modulo E. Throughout this paper we assume that
T
Σ,s ‰ H for every sort s, because this affords a simpler deduction system. An
equational theory pΣ, Eq is a pair with Σ an order-sorted signature and E a set
of Σ-equations. The E-subsumption preorder ĚE (or just Ě if E is understood)
holds between t, t1 P T
Σ
pX q, denoted t ĚE t
1 (meaning that t is more general
than t1 modulo E), if there is a substitution σ such that tσ “E t
1; such a
substitution σ is said to be an E-match from t1 to t.
An E-unifier for a Σ-equation t “ t1 is a substitution σ such that tσ “E t
1σ.
For Varptq Y Varpt1q Ď W , a set of substitutions CSUWE pt “ t
1q is said to be a
complete set of unifiers for the equality t “ t1 modulo E away fromW iff: (i) each
σ P CSUWE pt “ t
1q is an E-unifier of t “ t1; (ii) for any E-unifier ρ of t “ t1 there
is a σ P CSUWE pt “ t
1q such that σ|W ĚE ρ|W ; (iii) for all σ P CSU
W
E pt “ t
1q,
Dompσq Ď pVarptq Y Varpt1qq and Ranpσq XW “ H. If the set of variables W
is irrelevant or is understood from the context, we write CSUEpt “ t
1q instead
of CSUWE pt “ t
1q. An E-unification algorithm is complete if for any equation
t “ t1 it generates a complete set of E-unifiers. A unification algorithm is said
to be finitary and complete if it always terminates after generating a finite and
complete set of solutions.
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A rewrite rule is an oriented pair l Ñ r, where2 l R X and l, r P T
Σ
pX qs
for some sort s P S. An (unconditional) order-sorted rewrite theory is a triple
pΣ, E,Rq with Σ an order-sorted signature, E a set of Σ-equations, and R a set
of rewrite rules.
The rewriting relation on T
Σ
pX q, written t ÑR t
1 or t Ñp,R t
1 holds be-
tween t and t1 iff there exist p P PosΣptq, l Ñ r P R and a substitution σ,
such that t|p “ lσ, and t
1 “ trrσsp. The subterm t|p is called a redex. The
relation ÑR{E on TΣpX q is “E ;ÑR;“E , i.e., tÑR{E t
1 iff there exists u, u1 s.t.
t “E uÑR u
1 “E t
1. Note that ÑR{E on TΣpX q induces a relation ÑR{E on
the free pΣ, Eq-algebra T
Σ{EpX q by rtsE ÑR{E rt
1sE iff tÑR{E t
1. The transitive
(resp. transitive and reflexive) closure ofÑR{E is denoted Ñ
`
R{E (resp. Ñ
˚
R{E).
The ÑR{E relation can be difficult to compute. However, under the appro-
priate conditions it is equivalent to the R,E relation in which it is enough to
compute the relationship on any representatives of two E-equivalence classes.
A relationÑR,E on TΣpX q is defined as: tÑp,R,E t
1 (or just tÑR,E t
1) iff there
exist p P PosΣptq, a rule l Ñ r in R, and a substitution σ such that t|p “E lσ
and t1 “ trrσsp.
Let t be a term and W be a set of variables such that Varptq Ď W , the
R,E-narrowing relation on T
Σ
pX q is defined as t ❀p,σ,R,E t
1 (❀σ,R,E if p is
understood, ❀σ if R,E are also understood, and ❀ if σ is also understood)
if there is a non-variable position p P PosΣptq, a rule l Ñ r P R properly
renamed s.t. pVarplq YVarprqq XW “ H, and a unifier σ P CSUW
1
E pt|p “ lq for
W 1 “ W Y Varplq, such that t1 “ ptrrspqσ. For convenience, in each narrowing
step t❀σ t
1 we only specify the part of σ that binds variables of t. The transitive
(resp. transitive and reflexive) closure of ❀ is denoted by ❀` (resp. ❀˚). We
may write t❀kσ t
1 if there are u1, . . . , uk´1 and substitutions ρ1, . . . , ρk such that
t❀ρ1 u1 ¨ ¨ ¨uk´1❀ρk t
1, k ě 0, and σ “ ρ1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ρk.
Maude-NPA uses backwards narrowing (i.e., uses protocol rules l Ñ r “in
reverse” as rules r Ñ l) modulo the algebraic properties of cryptographic func-
tions as a sound and complete reachability analysis method. Section 9 gives
a detailed proof of the soundness and completeness of this method for strands
with choice.
3 Overview of Maude-NPA
Here we give a high-level summary of Maude-NPA. For further details please
see [Escobar et al(2017)].
Given a protocol P , we define its specification in the strand space model as a
2We do not impose the requirement Varprq Ď Varplq, since extra variables (e.g., choice
variables) may be introduced in the righthand side of a rule. Rewriting with extra variables
in righthand sides is handled by allowing the matching substitution to instantiate these extra
variables in any possible way. Although this may produce an infinite number of one-step con-
crete rewrites from a term due to the infinite number of possible instantiations, the symbolic,
narrowing-based analysis used by Maude-NPA and explained below can cover all those infinite
possibilities in a finitary way.
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rewrite theory of the form pΣSSP , ESSP , R
´1
BP
q, where (i) the signature ΣSSP is
split into predefined symbols ΣSS for strand syntax and user-definable symbols
ΣP based on a parametric sort Msg of messages, (ii) the algebraic properties
ESSP are also split into the algebraic properties of the strand notation ESS and
the user-definable algebraic properties EP for the cryptographic functions, and
(iii) the transition rules R´1BP are defined on states, i.e., terms of a predefined
sort State. They are reversed for backwards execution.
In Maude-NPA states are modeled as elements of an initial algebra TΣSSP {ESSP ,
i.e., an ESSP -equivalence class rtsESSP P TΣSSP {ESSP with t a ground ΣSSP -
term. A state has the form tS1& ¨ ¨ ¨ &Sn& tIKuu where & is an associative-
commutative union operator with identity symbol H. Each element in the set
is either a strand Si or the intruder knowledge tIKu at that state.
The intruder knowledge tIKu belongs to the state and is represented as a set
of facts using the comma as an associative-commutative union operator with
identity element empty. There are two kinds of intruder facts: positive knowl-
edge facts (the intruder knows message m, i.e., mPI), and negative knowledge
facts (the intruder does not yet know m but will know it in a future state, i.e.,
mRI), where m is a message expression.
A strand [Fabrega et al(1999)] specifies the sequence of messages sent and
received by a principal executing a given role in the protocol and is represented
as a sequence of messages rmsg˘
1
,msg˘
2
,msg˘
3
, . . . ,msg˘k´1,msg
˘
k s with msg
˘
i
either msg´i (also written ´msgi) representing an input message, or msg
`
i (also
written `msgi) representing an output message. Note that each msgi is a term
of a special sort Msg.
Strands are used to represent both the actions of honest principals (with a
strand specified for each protocol role) and the actions of an intruder (with a
strand for each action an intruder is able to perform on messages). In Maude-
NPA strands evolve over time; the symbol | is used to divide past and future.
That is, given a strand r msg˘
1
, . . . , msg˘i | msg
˘
i`1, . . . , msg
˘
k s, messages
msg˘
1
, . . . ,msg˘i are the past messages, and messages msg
˘
i`1, . . . ,msg
˘
k are the
future messages (msg˘i`1 is the immediate future message). A strand rmsg
˘
1
, . . . ,
msg˘k s is shorthand for rnil | msg
˘
1
, . . . ,msg˘k , nils. An initial state is a state
where the bar is at the beginning for all strands in the state, and the intruder
knowledge has no fact of the form mPI. A final state is a state where the bar is
at the end for all strands in the state and there is no intruder fact of the form
mRI.
Since the number of states TΣSSP {ESSP is in general infinite, rather than
exploring concrete protocol states rtsESSP P TΣSSP {ESSP Maude-NPA explores
symbolic strand state patterns rtpx1, . . . , xnqsESSP P TΣSSP {ESSP pX q on the free
pΣSSP , ESSP q-algebra over a set of variables X . In this way, a state pattern
rtpx1, . . . , xnqsESSP represents not a single concrete state but a possibly infinite
set of such states, namely all the instances of the pattern rtpx1, . . . , xnqsESSP
where the variables x1, . . . , xn have been instantiated by concrete ground terms.
The semantics of Maude-NPA is expressed in terms of the following forward
rewrite rules that describe how a protocol moves from one state to another via
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the intruder’s interaction with it.
tSS & rL | M´, L1s & tMPI, IKuu Ñ tSS & rL,M´ | L1s & tMPI, IKuu (-)
tSS & rL | M`, L1s & tIKuu Ñ tSS & rL,M` | L1s & tIKuu (+)
tSS & rL | M`, L1s & tMRI, IKuu Ñ tSS & rL,M` | L1s & tMPI, IKuu (++)
@ rl1, u
`, l2s P P : tSS& r l1|u
`, l2 s& tuRI, IKuu Ñ tSS & tuPI, IKuu (&)
where L and L1 are variables denoting a list of strand messages, IK is a variable
for a set of intruder facts (mPI or mRI), SS is a variable denoting a set of
strands, and l1, l2 denote a list of strand messages. The set R
´1
BP
of backwards
state transition rules is defined by reversing the direction of the above set of
rules t(-), (+), (++)u Y (&). In the backwards executions of (&), (++), uRI
marks when the intruder learnt u.
One uses Maude-NPA to find an attack by specifying an insecure state pat-
tern called an attack pattern. Maude-NPA attempts to find a path from an
initial state to the attack pattern via backwards narrowing (narrowing using
the rewrite rules with the orientation reversed). That is, a narrowing sequence
from an initial state to an attack state is searched in reverse as a backwards path
from the attack state to the initial state. Maude-NPA attempts to find paths
until it can no longer form any backwards narrowing steps, at which point it
terminates. If at that point it has not found an initial state, the attack pattern
is shown to be unreachable modulo ESSP . (Section 9 gives a detailed proof of
the soundness and completeness of this symbolic method for the Maude-NPA
extension supporting strands with choice). Note that Maude-NPA places no
bound on the number of sessions, so reachability is undecidable in general. Note
also that Maude-NPA does not perform any data abstraction such as a bounded
number of nonces. However, the tool makes use of a number of sound and com-
plete state space reduction techniques that help to identify unreachable and
redundant states, and thus make termination more likely.
4 A Process Algebra for Protocols with Choice
In this section we define a process algebra that extends the strand space model
to naturally specify protocols exhibiting choice points. Throughout the paper
we refer to this process algebra as the protocol process algebra.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, in Section 4.1 we
define the syntax of the protocol process algebra and state the requirements
that a well-formed process must satisfy. Then in Section 4.2, we explain how
protocol specifications can be defined in this process algebra. In Section 4.3 we
then define the operational semantics of the protocol process algebra. Note that
the operational semantics of Maude-NPA given in Section 3 corresponds to a
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symbolic backwards semantics while in Section 4.3 we give a rewriting-based
forwards semantics for process algebra. Sections 7 and 9 will relate these two
semantics using bisimulations.
4.1 Syntax of the Protocol Process Algebra
In the protocol process algebra the behaviors of both honest principals and the
intruder are represented by labeled processes. Therefore, a protocol is specified
as a set of labeled processes. Each process performs a sequence of actions,
namely, sending or receiving a message, and may perform deterministic or non-
deterministic choices. The protocol process algebra’s syntax is parameterized3
by a sort Msg of messages and has the following syntax:
ProcConf ::“ LProc | ProcConf & ProcConf | H
LProc ::“ pRole, I, Jq Proc
Proc ::“ nilP | `Msg | ´Msg | Proc ¨ Proc |
Proc ? Proc | if Cond then Proc else Proc
Cond ::“ Msg ‰ Msg | Msg “ Msg
• ProcConf stands for a process configuration, that is, a set of labeled pro-
cesses. The symbol & is used to denote set union for sets of labeled
processes.
• LProc stands for a labeled process, that is, a process Proc with a label
pRole, I, Jq. Role refers to the role of the process in the protocol (e.g.,
initiator or responder). I is a natural number denoting the identity of
the process, which distinguishes different instances(sessions) of a process
specification. J indicates that the action at stage J of the process specifi-
cation will be the next one to be executed, that is, the first J´1 actions of
the process for role Role have already been executed. Note that we omit
I and J in the protocol specification when both I and J are 0.
• Proc defines the actions that can be executed within a process. `Msg, and
´Msg respectively denote sending out or receiving a message Msg . We
assume a single channel, through which all messages are sent or received
by the intruder. “Proc ¨ Proc” denotes sequential composition of pro-
cesses, where symbol _._ is associative and has the empty process nilP
as identity. “Proc ? Proc” denotes an explicit nondeterministic choice,
whereas “if Cond then Proc else Proc” denotes an explicit deterministic
choice, whose continuation depends on the satisfaction of the constraint
Cond .
• Cond denotes a constraint that will be evaluated in explicit deterministic
choices. In this work we only consider constraints that are either equalities
(“) or disequalities (‰) between message expressions.
3More precisely, as explained in Section 4.2, they are parameterized by a user-definable
equational theory pΣP , EP q having a sort Msg of messages.
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Let PS, QS, and RS be process configurations, and P, Q, and R be protocol
processes. Our protocol syntax satisfies the following structural axioms :
PS&QS “ QS&PS (1)
pPS&QSq&RS “ PS& pQS&RSq (2)
pP ¨ Qq ¨ R “ P ¨ pQ ¨ Rq (3)
PS&H “ PS (4)
P ¨ nilP “ P (5)
nilP ¨ P “ P (6)
The specification of the processes defining a protocol’s behavior may contain
some variables denoting information that the principal executing the process
does not yet know, or that will be different in different executions. In all protocol
specifications we assume three disjoint kinds of variables:
• fresh variables: these are not really variables in the standard sense, but
names for constant values in a data type Vfresh of unguessable values such
as nonces. A fresh variable r is always associated with a role ro P Role
in the protocol. For each protocol session i, we associate to r a unique
name r.ro.i for a constant in the data type Vfresh. What is assumed is
that if r.ro.i ‰ r1.ro1.j (including the case r.ro.i ‰ r.ro.j), the values
interpreting r.ro.i and r1.ro1.j in Vfresh are both different and unguessable.
In particular, for role ro P Role, the interpretation mapping I : tr.ro.i |
i P Nu Ñ Vfresh is injective and random. In our semantics, a constant r.ro.i
denotes its (unguessable) interpretation Ipr.ro.iq P Vfresh. Throughout this
paper we will denote this kind of variables as r, r1, r2, . . ..
• choice variables: variables first appearing in a sent message `M , which
can be substituted by any value arbitrarily chosen from a possibly infinite
domain. A choice variable indicates an implicit non-deterministic choice.
Given a protocol with choice variables, each possible substitution of these
variables denotes a possible continuation of the protocol. We always de-
note choice variables by uppercase letters postfixed with the symbol “?”
as a subscript, e.g., A?, B?, . . ..
• pattern variables: variables first appearing in a received message ´M .
These variables will be instantiated when matching sent and received mes-
sages. Implicit deterministic choices are indicated by terms containing
pattern variables, since failing to match a pattern term may lead to the
rejection of a message. A pattern term plays the implicit role of a guard,
so that, depending on the different ways of matching it, the protocol can
have different continuations. This kind of variables will be written with
uppercase letters, e.g., A,B,NA, . . ..
Note that fresh variables are distinguished from other variables by having
a specific sort Fresh. Choice variables or pattern variables can never have sort
Fresh.
To guarantee the requirements on different kinds of variables that can appear
in a given process, we consider only well-formed processes. We make this notion
precise by defining a function wf : Proc Ñ Bool checking whether a given
process is well-formed. A labeled process is well-formed if the process it labels
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is well-formed. A process configuration is well-formed if all the labeled process
in it are well-formed. The definition of wf uses an auxiliary function shVar :
Proc Ñ VarSet , retrieving the “shared variables” of a process, i.e., the set of
variables that show up in all branches. Below we define both functions, where
P, Q, and R are processes, M is a message, and T is a constraint.
shVar p`M ¨ P q “ VarpMq Y shVarpP q
shVar p´M ¨ P q “ VarpMq Y shVarpP q
shVar ppif T then P else Qq ¨ Rq “ VarpT q Y pshVarpP q X shVarpQqq Y shVarpRq
shVar ppP ? Qq ¨ Rq “ pshVarpP q X shVarpQqq Y shVar pRq
shVar pnilPq “ H
wf pP ¨ `Mq “ wf pP q if pVarpMq X VarpP qq Ď shVarpP q
wf pP ¨ ´Mq “ wf pP q if pVarpMq X VarpP qq Ď shVarpP q
wf pP ¨ pif T then Q else Rqq “ wf pP ¨Qq ^ wf pP ¨Rq if P ‰ nilP and Q ‰ nilP and
VarpT q Ď shVar pP q
wf pP ¨ pQ ? Rqq “ wf pP ¨Qq ^ wf pP ¨ Rq if Q ‰ nilP orR ‰ nilP
wf pP ¨ nilPq “ wf pP q
wf pnilPq “ True.
Remark 1. Note that the well-formedness property implies that if a process be-
gins with a deterministic choice action if T then Q else R, then all variables in T
must be instantiated, and thus only one branch may be taken. For this reason, it
is undesirable to specify processes that begin with such an action. Furthermore,
note that the well-formedness property avoids explicit choices where both possi-
bilities are the nilP process. That is, processes containing either (if T then nil
else nil), or (nil ? nil), respectively.
We illustrate the notion of well-formed process below.
Example 4.1. The behavior of a Client initiating an instance of the handshake
protocol from Example 1.1 with the Server, where the Server may or may not
request the Client to authenticate itself, may be specified by the well-formed
process shown below:
pClientq ` phs;npC?, r1q;G?; genpG?q; keyGpG?, C?, r2qq ¨
´ phs;N ;G?; genpG?q;E;ZpAReq , G?, E,C?, r1, S,HMqq ¨
if pAReq “ authreqq
then
` pepkeyEpG?, E,C?, r1q,
sigpC,W pHM,AReq , S?, G?, E,C?, r1qq;
macpkeyEpG?, E, , C?, r1q,W pHM,AReq , S,G?, E,C?, r1qqqq ¨
else
` pepkeyEpG?, E,C?, r2q,
macpkeyEpG?, E,C?, r2q,W pHM,AReq , S,G?, E,C?, r1qqqq
where KeyG, Z and W are macros used to construct messages sent in the pro-
tocol. The variables C? and G? are choice variables denoting the client and
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Diffie-Hellman group respectively, and the variables r1 and r2 are fresh vari-
ables. All other variables are pattern variables. In particular, the variable AReq
is a pattern variable that can be instantiated to either authreq or noauthreq. The
Client makes a deterministic choice whether or not to sign its next message with
its digital signature, depending on which value of AReq it receives.
Example 4.2. The behavior of a Server who may or may not request a retry
from a Client in an instance of the handshake protocol from Example 1.1 may
be specified as follows:
pServerq : ´ phs;N ;G; genpGq;Eq¨
ppp`phs; retryq¨
´ phs;N 1;G1; genpG1q;E1q¨
` phs;npS?, r1q;G
1; genpG1q; keyGpG1, S?, r2q;ZpAReq?, G
1
, E
1
, S, r2, S?,HMqqq
?
p`phs;npS?, r1q;G; genpGq; keyGpG,S, r2q;ZpAReq?, G,E, S, r2, S?,HMqqqqq
In this case the server nondeterministically chooses to request or not to
request a retry. In the case of a retry it waits for the retry message from
the client, and then proceeds with the handshake message using the new key
information from the client. In the case when it does not request a retry, it sends
the handshake message immediately after receiving the client’s Hello message.
The variable r2 is a fresh variable, while S? and AReq? are choice variables. S?
denotes the name of the server, and AReq? is nondeterministically instantiated
to authreq or noauthreq.
Example 4.3. The following process does not satisfy the well-formedness prop-
erty.
pRespq ´ ppkpB,A;NAqq¨
p`ppkpA, 1;npB, rqqq ? ` ppkpA, 2qqq ¨
` ppkpC?, npB, rqqq
The problem with this process is the fresh variable r appearing in message
`ppkpC?, npB, rqqq, since
r R shVar p´ppkpB,A;NAqq ¨ p`ppkpA,1;npB, rqqq ? ` ppkpA, 2qqqq
more specifically, because it does not appear in message `ppkpA, 2qq, but r P
Varp´ppkpB,A;NAqq ¨ p`ppkpA, 1;npB, rqqq ? ` ppkpA, 2qqqq.
4.2 Protocol Specification in Process Algebra
Given a protocol P , we define its specification in the protocol process alge-
bra, written PPA, as a pair of the form PPA “ ppΣPAP , EPAP q, PPAq, where
pΣPAP , EPAP q is an equational theory explained below, and PPA is a term de-
noting a well-formed process configuration representing the behavior of the
honest principals as well as the capabilities of the attacker. That is, PPA “
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pro1 qP1 & . . . & proiqPi, where each rok, 1 ď k ď i, is either the role of
an honest principal or identifies one of the capabilities of the attacker. PPA
cannot contain two processes with the same label, i.e., the behavior of each
honest principal, and each attacker capability are represented by a unique pro-
cess. EPAP “ EP Y EPA is a set of equations with EP denoting the protocol’s
cryptographic properties and EPA denoting the properties of process construc-
tors. The set of equations EP is user-definable and can vary for different pro-
tocols. Instead, the set of equations EPA is always the same for all protocols.
ΣPAP “ ΣP Y ΣPA is the signature defining the sorts and function symbols as
follows:
• ΣP is an order-sorted signature defining the sorts and function symbols
for the messages that can be exchanged in protocol P . However, indepen-
dently of protocol P , ΣP must always have a sort Msg as the top sort in
one of its connected components. We call a sort S a data sort iff it is either
a subsort of Msg, or there is a message constructor c : S1...S...Sn Ñ S
1,
with S1 a subsort of Msg. The specific sort Fresh for fresh variables is an
example of data sort. Choice and pattern variables have sort Msg or any
of its subsorts.
• ΣPA is an order-sorted signature defining the sorts and function sym-
bols of the process algebra infrastructure. ΣPA corresponds exactly to the
BNF definition of the protocol process algebra’s syntax in Section 4.1.
Although it has a sort Msg for messages, it leaves this sort totally unspec-
ified, so that different protocols P may use completely different message
constructors and may satisfy different equational properties EP . There-
fore, ΣPA will be the same signature for any protocol specified in the
process algebra. More specifically, ΣPA contains the sorts for process
configurations (ProcConf), labeled processes (LProc), processes (Proc),
constraints (Cond), and messages(Msg), as well as the subsort relations
LProc ă ProcConf. Furthermore, the function symbols in ΣPA are also
defined according to the BNF definition.
Therefore, the syntax ΣPAP of processes for P will be in the union signature
ΣPAYΣP , consisting of the protocol-specific syntax ΣP , and the generic process
syntax ΣPA through the shared sort Msg.
4.3 Operational Semantics of the Protocol Process Alge-
bra
Given a protocol P , a state of P consists of a set of (possibly partially executed)
labeled processes, and a set of terms in the intruder’s knowledge tIKu. That is,
a state is a term of the form tLP1& ¨ ¨ ¨ &LPn | tIKuu. Given a state St of this
form, we abuse notation and write LPk P St if LPk is a labeled process in the
set LP1& ¨ ¨ ¨ &LPn.
The intruder knowledge IK models the single channel through which all
messages are sent and received. We consider an active attacker who has complete
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control of the channel, i.e, can read, alter, redirect, and delete traffic as well as
create its own messages by means of intruder processes. That is, the purpose of
some LPk P St is to perform message-manipulation actions for the intruder.
State changes are defined by a set RPAP of rewrite rules, such that the
rewrite theory pΣPAP`State , EPAP , RPAP q characterizes the behavior of protocol
P , where ΣPAP`State extends ΣPAP by adding state constructor symbols. We
assume that a protocol’s execution begins with an empty state, i.e., a state with
an empty set of labeled processes, and an empty intruder knowledge. That is,
the initial state is always of the form tH | temptyuu. Each transition rule in
RPAP is labeled with a tuple of the form pro, i , j , a, nq, where:
• ro is the role of the labeled process being executed in the transition.
• i denotes the identifier of the labeled process being executed in the tran-
sition. Since there can be more than one process instance of the same role
in a process state, i is used to distinguish different instances, i.e., ro and
i together uniquely identify a process in a state.
• j denotes the process’ step number since its beginning.
• a is a ground term identifying the action that is being performed in the
transition. It has different possible values: “`m” or “´m” if the message
m was sent (and added to the intruder’s knowledge) or received, respec-
tively; “m” if the message m was sent but did not increase the intruder’s
knowledge, “?” if the transition performs an explicit non-deterministic
choice, or “T” if the transition performs a explicit deterministic choice.
• n is a number that, if the action that is being executed is an explicit choice,
indicates which branch has been chosen as the process continuation. In
this case n takes the value of either 1 or 2. If the transition does not
perform any explicit choice, then n “ 0.
Below we describe the set of transition rules that define a protocol’s execution
in the protocol process algebra, that is, the set of rules RPAP . Note that in the
transition rules shown below, PS denotes the rest of labeled processes of the
state (which can be the empty set H).
• The action of sending a message is represented by the two transition rules
below. Since we assume the intruder has complete control of the network,
it can learn any message sent by other principals. Rule (PA++) denotes
the case in which the sent message is added to the intruder’s knowledge.
Note that this rule can only be applied if the intruder has not already
learnt that message. Rule (PA+) denotes the case in which the intruder
chooses not to learn the message, i.e., the intruder’s knowledge is not
modified, and, thus, no condition needs to be checked. Since choice vari-
ables denote messages that are nondeterministically chosen, all (possibly
infinitely many) admissible ground substitutions for the choice variables
are possible behaviors.
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tpro, i, jq p`M ¨ P q & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,`Mσ,0q tpro, i, j ` 1q Pσ & PS | tMσPI, IKuu
if pMσPIq R IK
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in M (PA++)
tpro, i, jq p`M ¨ P q & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,Mσ,0q tpro, i, j ` 1q Pσ & PS | tIKuu
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in M (PA+)
• As shown in the rule below, a process can receive a message matching
a pattern M if there is a message M 1 in the intruder’s knowledge, i.e.,
a message previously sent either by some honest principal or by some
intruder process, that matches the pattern message M . After receiving
this message the process will continue with its variables instantiated by
the matching substitution, which takes place modulo the equations EP .
Note that the intruder can “delete” a message via choosing not to learn it
(executing Rule PA+ instead of Rule PA++) or not to deliver it (failing
to execute Rule PA-).
tpro, i, jq p´M ¨ P q & PS | tM 1PI, IKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,´Mσ,0q tpro, i, j ` 1q Pσ & PS | tM
1PI, IKuu
if M 1 “EP Mσ (PA-)
• The two transition rules shown below define the operational semantics of
explicit deterministic choices. That is, the operational semantics of an
if T then P else Q expression. More specifically, rule (PAif1) describes
the then case, i.e., if the constraint T is satisfied, the process will continue
as P . Rule (PAif2) describes the else case, that is, if the constraint T
is not satisfied, the process will continue as Q. Note that, since we only
consider well-formed processes, these transition rules will only be applied
if j ě 1. Note also that since T has been fully substituted by the time
the if-then-else is executed, and the constraints that we considered in this
paper are of the form m ‰EP m
1 or m “EP m
1, the satisfiability of T
can be checked by checking whether the corresponding ground equality or
disequality holds.
tpro, i, jq ppif T then P else Qq ¨Rq & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,T,1q tpro, i, j ` 1q pP ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu if T (PAif1)
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tpro, i, jq ppif T then P else Qq ¨Rq & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,T,2q tpro, i, j ` 1q pQ ¨Rq & PS | tIKuu if  T (PAif2)
• The two transition rules below define the semantics of explicit non-deterministic
choice P ? Q. In this case, the process can continue either as P , denoted
by rule (PA?1), or as Q, denoted by rule (PA?2). Note that this decision
is made non-deterministically.
tpro, i, jq ppP ? Qq ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,?,1q tpro, i, j ` 1q pP ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu (PA?1)
tpro, i, jq ppP ? Qq ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i,j,?,2q tpro, i, j ` 1qpQ ¨Rq & PS | tIKuu (PA?2)
• The transition rules shown below describe the introduction of a new pro-
cess from the specification into the state, which allows us to support
an unbounded session model. Recall that fresh variables are associated
with a role and an identifier. Therefore, whenever a new process is in-
troduced: (a) the largest process identifier piq will be increased by 1, and
(b) new names will be assigned to the fresh variables in the new pro-
cess. The function MaxProcIdpPS, roq in the transition rule below is used
to get the largest process identifier piq of role ro in the process config-
uration PS. The substitution ρro,i`1 in the transition rule below takes
a labeled process and assigns new names to the fresh variables accord-
ing to the label. More specifically, pro, i ` 1, 1q Pkpr1, . . . , rnqρro,i`1 “
pro, i ` 1, 1q Pkpr1, . . . , rnqtr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i ` 1, . . . , rn ÞÑ rn.ro.i ` 1u. In a
process state, a role name together with an identifier uniquely identifies
a process. Therefore, there is a unique subset of fresh names for each
process in the state. In the rest of this paper we will refer to this kind of
substitutions as fresh substitutions.
$’’’’’’&
’’’’’%
@ proq Pk P PPA
tPS | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i`1,1,A,Numq tpro, i` 1, 2q P
1
k & PS | tIK
1uu
IF tpro, i` 1, 1q Pkρro,i`1 | tIKuu
ÝÑpro,i`1,1,A,Numq tpro, i` 1, 2q P
1
k | tIK
1uu
where ρro,i`1 is a fresh substitution,
i “ MaxProcIdpPS, roq
,//////.
/////-
(PA&)
Note that A denotes the action of the state transition, and can be of any of
the forms explained above. The function MaxProcId is defined as follows:
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MaxProcIdpH, roq “ 0
MaxProcIdppro, i, jqP&PS, roq “ maxpMaxProcIdpPS, roq, iq
MaxProcIdppro1, i, jqP&PS, roq “ MaxProcIdpPS, roq if ro ‰ ro1
where PS denotes a process configuration, P denotes a process, and ro, ro1
denote role names.
Therefore, the behavior of a protocol in the process algebra is defined by the
set of transition rulesRPAP “ t(PA++), (PA+), (PA-), (PAif1), (PAif2), (PA?1),
(PA?2)u Y (PA&).
Our main result is a bisimulation between the state space generated by
the transition rules R´1BP , associated to the symbolic backwards semantics of
Section 3, and the transition rules RPAP above, associated to the forwards
semantics for process algebra. This is nontrivial, since there are three major
ways in which the two semantics differ. The first is that processes “forget”
their past, while strands “remember” theirs. The second is that Maude-NPA
uses backwards search, while the process algebra proceeds forwards. The third
is that Maude-NPA performs symbolic reachability analysis using terms with
variables, while the process algebra considers only ground terms.
We systematically relate these different semantics by introducing an interme-
diate semantics, a forward strand space semantics extending that in [Escobar et al(2014)].
First, in Section 5 we extend the strand space model with constraints, since
strands are the basis of both the forwards semantics and the backwards se-
mantics of Maude-NPA. In Section 6 we augment the forwards strand space
semantics of [Escobar et al(2014)] with choice operators and operational seman-
tic rules to produce a constrained forwards semantics. In Section 7 we prove
bisimilarity of the process algebra semantics of Section 4 and the constrained
forwards semantics of Section 6. In [Escobar et al(2014)] the forwards strand
space semantics was proved sound and complete w.r.t. the original symbolic
backwards semantics of Maude-NPA. But now such proofs had to be extended
to handle constraints. In Section 8 we also augment the original symbolic back-
wards semantics of Maude-NPA with choice operators and operational semantic
rules to produce a constrained backwards semantics. In Section 9, we then prove
that the constrained backwards semantics is sound and complete with respect to
the constrained forwards semantics. By combining the bisimulation between the
process algebra and the constrained forwards semantics on the one hand, and the
bisimulation between the constrained forwards semantics and the constrained
backwards semantics on the other hand, we obtain the main bisimulation result.
Besides providing a detailed semantic account of how the strand model can
be extended with choice features, the key practical importance of these bisim-
ulation results is that, with the relatively modest extensions to Maude-NPA
described in Section 10.1 and supported by its recent 3.0 release, sound and
complete analysis of protocols with choice features specified in process algebra
is made possible.
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5 Constrained Protocol Strands with Choice
To specify and analyze protocols with choices in Maude-NPA, in this section
we extend Maude-NPA’s strand notation by adding new symbols to support
explicit choices. We refer to the strands in this extended syntax as constrained
protocol strands.
In Section 5.1 we describe the syntax for constrained protocol strands. Then,
in Section 5.2 we define a mapping from a protocol specification in the proto-
col process algebra, as described in Section 4.2, to a specification based on
constrained protocol strands.
5.1 Constrained Protocol Strands Syntax
In this section we extend Maude-NPA’s syntax by adding constrained messages,
which are terms of the form tCstr ,Numu, where Cstr is a constraint, and Num
is a natural number that identifies the continuation of the protocol’s execution,
among the two possibilities after an explicit choice point. More specifically,
we extend the ΣSS part of the signature ΣSSP of the Maude-NPA’s syntax we
defined in Section 3 as follows:
• A new sort Cstr represents the constraints allowed in constrained messages,
containing three symbols: (i) ? : Ñ Cstr, (ii) “ : Msg Msg Ñ Cstr, and
(iii) ‰ : Msg Msg Ñ Cstr.
• A new sort CstrMsg for constrained messages, such that CstrMsg ă SMsg,
where SMsg is an existing Maude-NPA sort denoting signed messages (i.e.,
messages with + or -). Therefore, now a strand is a sequence of output,
input and constrained messages.
• A new operator t , u : Cstr Nat Ñ CstrMsg constructs constrained mes-
sages.
We refer to this extended signature as ΣCstrSSP . Note that the protocol
signature ΣP is contained in ΣSSP , and therefore in ΣCstrSSP . Furthermore, in
the constrained semantics we allow each honest principal or intruder capability
strand to be labeled by the “role” of that strand in the protocol (e.g., (Client)
or (Server)). Therefore, strands are now terms of the form pro, iqru1, . . . , uns,
where ro denotes the role of the strand in the protocol, i is a unique identifier
distinguishing different instances of strands of the same role, and each ui can be
a sent or received message, i.e., a term of the form M˘, or a constraint message
of the form tCstr , Numu. We often omit i, or both ro and i for clarity when
they are not relevant.
5.2 Protocol Specification using Constrained Protocol Strands
The behavior of a protocol involving choices can be specified using the syntax
presented in Section 5.1 as described below.
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Definition 1 (Constrained protocol strand specification). Given a protocol P,
we define its specification by means of constrained protocol strands, written
PCstrSS , as a tuple of the form PCstrSS “ ppΣCstrSSP , ESSP q, PCstrSS q, where
ΣCstrSSP is the protocol’s signature (see Section 5.1), and ESSP “ EP YESS is
a set of equations as we defined in Section 3, where EP denotes the protocol’s
cryptographic properties and ESS denotes the protocol-independent properties of
constructors of strands. That is, the set of equations EP may vary depending
on different protocols, but the set of equations ESS is always the same for all
protocols. PCstrSS is a set of constrained protocol strands as defined in Sec-
tion 5.1, representing the behavior of the honest principals as well as the capa-
bilities of the attacker. That is, PCstrSS is a set of labeled strands of the form:
PCstrSS “ tpro1 qru1,1, . . . , u1,n1s & . . . & prom qrum,1, . . . , um,nmsu, where, for
each rok such that 1 ď k ď i, rok is either the role of an honest principal,
or identifies one of the capabilities of the attacker. We note that PCstrSS may
contain several strands with the same label, each defining one of the possible
paths of such a principal.
The protocol specification described above can be obtained by transforming
a specification in the process algebra of Section 4.2 as follows. Given a protocol
P , its specification in the process algebra PPA, consists of a set of well-formed
labeled processes. We transform a term denoting a set of labeled processes into
a term denoting a set of constrained protocol strands by the mapping toCstrSS.
The intuitive idea is that, since our process contains no recursion, each process
can be “deconstructed” as a set of constrained protocol strands, where each
such strand represent a possible execution path of the process.
The mapping toCstrSS is specified in Definition 2 below.
Definition 2 (Mapping labeled processes toCstrSS). Given a labeled process LP
and a process configuration LPS, we define the mapping toCstrSS : TΣPAP pX q Ñ
TΣCstrSSP pX q recursively as follows:
toCstrSSpLP & LPSq “ toCstrSS*pLP ,nilPq & toCstrSSpLPSq
toCstrSSpHq “ H
where H is the empty set of strands. toCstrSS* is an auxiliary mapping that
maps a term denoting a labeled process to a term that denotes a set of con-
strained protocol strands. It takes two arguments: a labeled process, and a tem-
porary store that keeps a sequence of messages. More specifically, toCstrSS* :
TΣPAP pX q ˆ TΣCstrSSP pX q Ñ TΣCstrSSP pX q is defined as follows:
toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq nilP , Lq “ pro, iq r L s
toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq `M . P, Lq “ toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq P, pL, `Mqq
toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq ´M . P, Lq “ toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq P, pL, ´Mqq
toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq (if T then P else Qq . R,Lq
“ toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq P . R, pL, tT, 1uqq & toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq Q . R, pL, t T, 2uqq
toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq pP ? Qq . R,Lq
“ toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq P . R, pL, t?, 1uqq & toCstrSS*ppro, i, jq Q . R, pL, t?, 2uqq
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where P , Q, and R denote processes, M is a message, T is a constraint, and L
denotes a list of messages, i.e., input, output or constraint messages.
Note that toCstrSS does not modify output and input messages, since mes-
sages are actually terms in TΣP {EP pX q in both the protocol process algebra, and
the constrained forwards semantics. toCstrSS can be used both as a map be-
tween specifications, and as a map from process configurations and strand sets
appearing in states.
We illustrate the toCstrSS transformation with the example below.
Example 5.1. If we apply the mapping toCstrSS to the process in Example 4.2
we obtain the following term which denotes a set of strands:
pServerq r t?, 1u,
´ phs;N ;G; genpGq;Eq,
` phs; retryq,
´ phs;N 1;G1; genpG1q;E1qq,
` phs;npS?, r1q;G
1; genpG1q; keyGpG1, S?, r2q;ZpAReq?, G
1
, E
1
, S, r2, S?,HMqqs &
pServerq r t?, 2u,
´ phs;N ;G; genpGq;Eq,
` phs;npS?, r1q;G; genpGq;keyGpG,S, r2q;ZpAReq?, G,E, S, r2, S?,HMqqs
A protocol specification in the protocol process algebra can then be trans-
formed into a specification of that protocol in the constrained protocol strands
described below using toCstrSS.
Definition 3 (Specification transformation). Given a protocol P and its proto-
col process algebra specification PPA “ ppΣPAP , EP Y EPAq, PPAq, with PPA “
pro1qP1& . . .&pronqPn, its specification by means of constrained protocol strands
is PCstrSS “ ppΣCstrSSP , EP Y ESS q, PCstrSS q with PCstrSS “ toCstrSSpPPAq.
6 Constrained Forwards Strand Semantics
In this section we extend Maude-NPA’s rewriting-based forwards semantics in
[Escobar et al(2014)] by adding new transition rules for constrained messages.
We refer to this extended forwards semantics as constrained forwards strand
semantics. We show that the process algebra semantics and the constrained
forwards strand semantics are label bisimilar. Therefore, protocols exhibiting
choices can be specified and executed in an equivalent way in both semantics.
In the constrained forwards strand semantics, state changes are defined by a
setRCstrFP of rewrite rules, so that the rewrite theory pΣCstrSSP , ESSP , RCstrFP q
characterizes the behaviors of protocol P .
The set of transition rules RCstrFP is an extension of the transition rules RFP
in [Escobar et al(2014)]. The transition rules are generated from the protocol
specification. A state consists of a multiset of partially executed strands and a
set of terms denoting the intruder’s knowledge. The main differences between
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the sets RCstrFP and RFP are: (i) new transition rules are added in RCstrFP to
appropriately deal with constraint messages, (ii) strands are labeled with the
role name, together with the identifier for distinguishing different instances, as
explained in Section 5.1, (iii) transitions are also labeled, similarly as in the
protocol process algebra, (iv) the global counter for generating fresh variables
is deleted from the state. Instead, special unique names are assigned to fresh
variable, which simplifies our notation.
In the constrained forwards strand semantics we label each transition rule
similarly as in Section 4.3, that is, using labels of the form pro, i, j, a, nq, where
ro, i, a, and n are as explained in Section 4.3, and j in this case is the po-
sition of the message that is being exchanged in the state transition. Also,
similar to Section 4.3, for transitions that send out messages containing choice
variables, all (possibly infinitely many) admissible ground substitutions for the
choice variables are possible behaviors. A similar mechanism for distinguishing
different fresh variables is used as that explained in Section 4.3. Since messages
are introduced into strands in the state incrementally, we instantiate the fresh
variables incrementally as well. Recall that fresh variables always first show up
in a sent message. Therefore, each time a sent message is introduced into a
strand in the state, we assign new names to the fresh variables in the message
being introduced. The function MaxStrId for getting the max identifier for a
constrained strand of a certain role is similar to MaxProcId in Section 4.3.
Since now messages in a strand can be sent or received messages, i.e., terms
of the formm` orm´, as well as constraint messages tCstr ,Numu, we represent
them in the rules below simply as terms of the form ui when their exact form is
not relevant. We will use the precise form of the message when disambiguation
is needed.
Before explaining the new transition rules for constraint messages, we show
how the transition rules in [Escobar et al(2014)] are labeled.
The constrained forwards strand semantics extends Maude-NPA’s forwards
semantics in [Escobar et al(2014)] by adding transition rules to handle con-
straint messages, i.e, messages of the form tCstr ,Numu, where Num can be
either 1 or 2. First, we add the two transition rules below for the cases when
such a constrained message comes from explicit choices. Note that, as a con-
sequence of well-formedness, the constraints introduce no new variables, and
since the constraints that we consider are of the form m ‰EP m
1 or m “EP m
1,
the satisfiability of Cstr can be checked by checking whether the corresponding
ground equality or disequality holds.
$’’’’’&
’’’’’%
@ proq ru1, . . . , uj´1, u
`
j , uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstrSS ^ ją1 :
tSS & tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1su
Ñpro,i,j,pujρro,iσq`,0q
tSS & tujρro,iσPI, IKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1, pujρro,iσq
`su
IF pujρro,iσPIq R IK
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in uj ,
ρro,i “ tr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i, . . . , rn ÞÑ rn.ro.iu is a fresh substitution.
,/////.
/////-
(F++)
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$’’’’&
’’’’’%
@ proq ru1, . . . , uj´1, u
`
j , uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstrSS ^ ją1 :
tSS& tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1su
Ñpro,i,j,ujρro,iσ,0q
tSS& tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1, pujρro,iσq
`su
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in uj ,
ρro,i “ tr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i, . . . , rn ÞÑ rn.ro.iu is a fresh substitution.
,////.
/////-
(F+)
$’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
@ proq ru`
1
, . . . , uns P PCstrSS :
tSS& tIKuu Ñpro,i`1,j,pu1ρro,i`1σq`,0q
tSS& pro, i` 1q rpu1ρro,i`1σq
`s& tu1ρro,i`1σPI, IKuu
IF pu1ρro,i`1σPIq R IK
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in u1,
i “ MaxStrIdpSS, roq,
ρro,i`1 “ tr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i` 1, . . . , rn ÞÑ rn.ro.i` 1u is a fresh substitution.
,///////.
//////-
(F++&)
$’’’’&
’’’’’%
@ proq ru`
1
, . . . , uns P PCstrSS :
tSS& tIKuu Ñpro,i`1,j,u1ρro,i`1σ,0q
tSS & pro, i` 1q rpu1ρro,i`1σq
`s& tIKuu
where σ is a ground substitution binding choice variables in u1,
i “ MaxStrIdpSS, roq,
ρro,i`1 “ tr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i` 1, . . . , rn ÞÑ rn.ro.i` 1u is a fresh substitution.
,////.
/////-
(F+&)
$’’&
’’%
@ proq ru1, . . . , uj´1, u
´
j , uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstrSS ^ j ą 1 :
tSS &tujPI, IKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1su
Ñ
pro,i,j,u´
j
,0q
tSS& tujPI, IKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1, u
´
j su
,//.
//-
(F-)
$’’&
’’%
@proq ru´1 , u2, . . . , uns P PCstrSS :
tSS& tu1PI, IKuu
Ñ
pro,i`1,1,u´
1
,0q
tSS & pro, i` 1q ru´
1
s& tu1PI, IKuu
where i “ MaxStrIdpSS, roq
,//.
//-
(F-&)
$’’’’&
’’’’%
@ proq ru1, . . . , uj´1, tCstr ,Numu, uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstrSS
^j ą 1 :
tSS &tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1su
Ñpro,i,j,T,Numq
tSS& tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1, tCstr ,Numusu
IF Cstr
,////.
////-
(Fif)
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$’’’&
’’’%
@ proq ru1, . . . , uj´1, t?,Numu, uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstrSS
^j ą 1 :
tSS &tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1su
Ñpro,i,j,?,Numq
tSS& tIKu& pro, iq ru1, . . . , uj´1, t?,Numusu
,///.
///-
(F?)
The following set of transition rules adds to the state a new strand whose
first message is a constraint message of the form t?,Numu:
$’’’&
’’’%
@ proq r t?,Numu, u2, . . . , uns P PCstrSS :
tSS & tIKuu
Ñpro,i`1,1,?,Numq
tSS & pro, i` 1q r t?,Numu s& tIKuu
where i “ MaxStrIdpSS, roq
,///.
///-
(F?&)
Definition 4. Let P be a protocol with signature ΣCstrSSP and equational theory
ESSP . We define the constrained forwards rewrite theory characterizing P as
pΣCstrSSP , ESSP , RCstrFP q where RCstrFP “ (F++)Y(F+)Y(F++&)Y(F+&)Y
(F-)Y (F-&)Y (Fif)Y (F?)Y (F?&).
7 Bisimulation between Constrained Forwards
Strand Semantics and Process Algebra Seman-
tics
In this section we show that the process algebra semantics and the constrained
forwards strand semantics are label bisimilar. We first define PA-State and
FW-State, the respective notions of state in each semantics.
Definition 5 (PA-State). Given a protocol P, a PA-State of P is a state in the
protocol process algebra semantics that is reachable from the initial state. The
initial PA-State is Pinit “ tH | temptyuu.
Definition 6 (FW-State). Given a protocol P, a FW-State of P is a state
in the constrained forwards strand semantics that is reachable from the initial
state. The initial FW-State is Finit “ tH & temptyuu.
The bisimulation relation is defined based on reachability, i.e., if a PA-State
and a FW-State are in the relation H, then they both can be reached from
their corresponding initial states by the same label sequence. Note that we only
consider states that are reachable from the initial states.
Let us first define the notation of label sequence that we will use throughout.
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Definition 7 (Label Sequence). An ordered sequence α of transition labels is
defined by using . as an associative concatenation operator with nil as an
identity. The length of a label sequence α is denoted by |α|. Given a label
sequence α, we denote by α|pro,iq the sub-sequence of labels in α that have ro
as role name, and i as identifier, i.e., labels of the form pro, i, , , q ( is a
shorthand for denoting any term).
Definition 8 (Relation H). Given a protocol P, the relation H is defined as:
H “ tpPst ,Fstq P PA-Stateˆ FW-State | D label sequence α s.t. Pinit Ñα Pst ,
Finit Ñα Fstu.
Recall that a process can be “deconstructed” by the mapping toCstrSS into a
set of constrained protocol strands, each representing a possible execution path.
If a PA-State Pst and a FW-State Fst are related by H, then an important
observation is that there is a duality between individual processes in Pst and
strands in Fst : if there is a process in the Pst describing a role’s continuation
in the future, there will be a corresponding strand in Fst describing the part of
the process that has already been executed, and vice versa. Another observation
is that, since the intruder’s knowledge is extracted from the communication
history, following the definition of H, the states Pst and Fst have the same
communication history, therefore they have the same intruder’s knowledge. We
formalize these observations in Lemmas 1 and 2. These lemmas then lead us to
the main result that H is a bisimulation relation.
We now define the relation HLP Str , which relates a possibly partially exe-
cuted labeled process and a constrained strand. This relation defines the duality
relation between a labeled process and a constrained strands. If a labeled pro-
cess LP is related to a constrained strand Str by the relation HLP Str , then:
(i) LP and Str denote the behavior of the same role with the same identity
in the same protocol, and (ii) for any strand StrLP , StrLP denotes a possible
execution path of LP iff Str followed by StrLP forms a valid possible execution
path of the protocol.
Definition 9 (Relation HLP Str ). Given a protocol P, and a possibly partially
executed labeled process LP of P, a possibly partially executed constrained strand
Str of P, then pLP, Strq P HLP Str iff
toCstrSSpLP q “ &tpro, iqruj`1, . . . , unsρro,iθ | D ground substitution θ
Dproqru1, . . . uj , uj`1, . . . , uns P PCstr s.t. Str “ pro, iqru1, . . . ujsρro,iθu
where &tS1, S2, . . . , Snu is a shorthand for a term S1&S2& . . .&Sn denoting
a set of strands. ρro,i “ tr1 ÞÑ r1.ro.i, . . . , rm ÞÑ rm.ro.iu for fresh variables
r1, . . . , rm in ru1, . . . uj, uj`1, . . . , uns.
Example 7.1. Following Examples 4.2 and 5.1, we show a process LP and a
strand Str that are related by the relation HLP Str . LP (resp. Str) is the la-
beled process (resp. constrained strand) of the Server role after making the first
explicit nondeterministic choice.
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LP “pServer , 1 , 2 q σp`phs; retryq ¨ ´phs;N 1;G1; genpG1q;E1q¨
` phs;npS?, r1q;G
1; genpG1q; keyGpG1, S?, r2q;
ZpAReq
?
, G
1
, E
1
, S, r2, S?,HMqqq
Str “pServer , 1 q σr t?, 1u,´phs;N ;G; genpGq;Eqs
where σ is a ground substitution to the pattern variables N , G, and E.
We then lift the duality relation between individual processes and strands
to a duality relation between PA-State and FW-State.
Definition 10 (Relation HPS FS ). Let Pst “ tLP1& . . .&LPn | tIKuu be a
PA-State and Fst “ tStr1& . . .&Strm&tIK
1uu be a FW-State, if pPst ,Fstq P
HPS FS , then:
(i) For each labeled process LPk P Pst, 1 ď k ď n, there exists a strand
Strk1 P Fst, 1 ď k
1 ď m, such that pLPk, Strk1q P HLP Str .
(ii) For each strand Strk1 P Fst, 1 ď k
1 ď m, there exists a labeled process
LPk P Pst, 1 ď k ď n, such that pLPk, Strk1q P HLP Str .
The lemma below states that the relation H induces the duality relation
HPS FS .
Lemma 1. Let Pst “ tLP1& . . .&LPn | tIKuu be a PA-State and Fst “
tStr1& . . .&Strm&tIK
1uu be a FW-State, if pPst ,Fstq P H, i.e., exists a label
sequence α such that Pinit Ñα Pst, and Finit Ñα Fst, then pPst ,Fstq P HPS FS .
Proof. We first prove property (i). If |α| “ 0, since both the strand set and the
process configuration are empty, the statement is vacuously true.
Now suppose that |α| ą 0. Then, without loss of generality, assume there
exists a labeled process LPk “ ppro, i, jq Pkq in Pst , with i, j ě 1. Then there is
at least one label in α of the form pro, i, , , q ( is a short hand for any content),
therefore, there is a strand Stk1 in Fst of the form pro, iqrv1, . . . , vj1 s.
We then show that the above-mentioned LPk and Strk1 are related by
HLP Str , i.e., pLPk, Strk1q P HLP Str . Since the state Fst is reachable from
the initial state by the label sequence α, and Strk1 P Fst, rv1, . . . , vj1 s denotes
exactly the sequence of messages in the unique sequence of labels α|pro,iq. More-
over, j1 “ j ´ 1.
Since the process state Pst is reachable from the initial state Pinit by label
sequence α, there exists a unique process proqPspec in the specification PPA,
and LPk represents all possible behaviors of proqPspec after the sequence of
transitions α|pro,iq. Therefore, toCstrSSpLPkq “
&tpro, iqruj, . . . , unsρro,iθ |
D ground substitution θ
Dproqru1, . . . , uj´1, uj , . . . , uns P toCstrSSpproqPspecq
s.t. pro, iqru1, . . . , uj´1sρro,iθ “ pro, iqrv1, . . . , vj´1su
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By the correspondence between protocol specifications defined in definition 3 ,
PCstrF “ toCstrSSpPPAq. Also note that proqPspec is the only process in PPA
that has ro as its role name, therefore, toCstrSSpproqPspecq “ tproqru1, . . . , uns |
proqru1, . . . , uns P PCstrF u. Therefore, toCstrSSpLPkq “
&tpro, iqruj , . . . unsρro,iθ |
D ground substitution θ,
Dproqru1, . . . , uj´1, uj, . . . , uns P PCstrF
s.t. pro, iqru1, . . . , uj´1sρro,iθ “ pro, iqrv1, . . . , vj´1su.
Therefore, pLPk, Strk1q P HLP Str . The proof for property (ii) is similar to the
one for property (i).
Lemma 2 below formalizes the observation that the equivalence of label
sequence implies the same intruder knowledge.
Lemma 2. Given a PA-State Pst and a FW-State Fst such that pPst ,Fstq P H,
i.e., there exists a label sequence α such that Pinit Ñα Pst and Finit Ñα Fst,
then the contents of intruder knowledge in Pst and in Fst are syntactically equal.
Proof. In both semantics the only transition rules that add new elements to the
intruder’s knowledge are the ones whose label is of the form pro, i, j,`m,nq.
Therefore, given the two states Pst and Fst as described above, their intruder’s
knowledge can be computed from the sequence of labeled transitions α as
IK pPstq “ tmPI | p , , ,`m, q P αu “ IK pFstq.
Based on the lemmas above, we can now show that the relation H is a
bisimulation. Since the proof of Theorem 1 requires a somewhat lengthy case
analysis, it has been moved to Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (Bisimulation). H is a bisimulation.
8 Constrained Backwards Strand Semantics
In this section we extend Maude-NPA’s symbolic backwards semantics with
rules for constrained messages of the form described in Section 5.1, so that it
can analyze protocols exhibiting explicit choices. We refer to this extended
backwards semantics as constrained backwards strand semantics. We then show
that the constrained backwards strand semantics is sound and complete with
respect to the constrained forwards strand semantics presented in Section 6,
and the process algebra semantics presented in Section 4. This result allows
us to use Maude-NPA for analyzing protocols exhibiting choice, including both
implicit and explicit choices, and in particular any protocol specified using the
protocol process algebra.
The strand space model used in the constrained backwards strand semantics
is the same as the one already used in Maude-NPA [Escobar et al(2009)], except
for the following differences:
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• Maude-NPA explores constrained states as defined in [Escobar et al(2015)],
that is, states that have an associated constraint store. More specifically,
a constrained state is a pair xSt,Ψy consisting of a state expression St and
a constraint, i.e., a set Ψ understood as a conjunction Ψ “
Źn
i“1ui ­“ vi
of disequality constraints.
• Strands are now of the form ru1, . . . , ui | ui`1, . . . uns, where each uk can
be of one of these forms: (i) m` if it is a sent message, (ii) m´ if it is a
received message, or (iii) tCstr,Numu if it is a constrained message.
State changes are described by a set R´1CstrBP of rewrite rules, so that the
rewrite theory pΣCstrSSP , ESSP , R
´1
CstrBP
q characterizes the behavior of protocol
P modulo the equations ESSP for backwards execution. The set of rules R
´1
CstrBP
is obtained as follows. First, we adapt the set of rules R´1BP in Section 3 to
constrained states, which is an embedding of rules in R´1BP . Their forwards
version is shown below:
xtSS & rL | M´, L1s & tMPI, IKuu,Ψy
Ñ xtSS & rL,M´ | L1s & tMPI, IKuu,Ψy (B-)
xtSS & rL | M`, L1s & tIKuu,Ψy
Ñ xtSS & rL,M` | L1s & tIKuu,Ψy (B+)
xtSS & rL | M`, L1s & tMRI, IKuu,Ψy
Ñ xtSS & rL,M` | L1s & tMPI, IKuu,Ψy (B++)
@ rl1, u
`, l2s P P :
xttSS& r l1| u
`, l2 s& tuRI, IKuu,Ψy
Ñ xtSS& tuPI, IKuuu,Ψy
(B&)
where L and L1 are variables denoting a list of strand messages, IK is a variable
for a set of intruder facts (mPI or mRI), SS is a variable denoting a set of
strands, and l1, l2 denote a list of strand messages.
Then, we define new transition rules for constrained messages. That is, we
add the reversed version of the following rules:
xtSS& tIK1u& proqrL | t?,Numu, L1su,Ψy
Ñ xtSS& tIK1u& proqrL, t?,Numu | L1su,Ψy (B?)
xtSS& tIKu& proqrL | tM “EP M,Numu, L
1su,Ψy
Ñ xtSS& tIKu& proqrL, tM “EP M,Numu | L
1su,Ψy (Bif=)
xtSS& tIKu& proqrL | tM ‰M 1,Numu, L1su, pΨ^M ‰M 1qy
Ñ xtSS& tIKu& proqrL, tM ‰M 1,Numu | L1su,Ψy
if pΨ^M ‰EP M
1q is satisfiable in TΣCstrSSP {EP pX q (Bif‰)
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Rule (B?) processes a constraint message denoting an explicit non-deterministic
choice with constant “?”. The constraint store is not changed and no satisfia-
bility check is required.
Rules (Bif=) and (Bif‰) deal with constrained messages associated to ex-
plicit deterministic choices. Since the only constraints we allow in explicit de-
terministic choices are equalities and disequalities, rule (Bif=) is for the case
when the constraint is an equality, rule (Bif‰) is for the case when the con-
straint is a disequality. The equality constraint is solved by EP -unification.
The constraint in a constrained state is therefore a disequality constraint, i.e.,
Ψ “
Źn
i“1ui ‰EP vi. The semantics of such a constrained state, written
rrxSt,Ψyss is the set of all ground substitution instances of the form:
rrxSt,Ψyss “ tStθ | θ P rX Ñ TΣP s ^ uiθ ‰EP viθ, 1 ď i ď nu
The disequality constraints are then solved the same way as in [Escobar et al(2015)].
Definition 11. Let P be a protocol with signature ΣCstrSSP and equational the-
ory EP . We define the constrained backwards rewrite theory characterizingP to
be
pΣCstrSSP , ESSP , R
´1
CstrBP
q where ESSP is same as explained in Section 3. R
´1
CstrBP
is the result of reversing the rewrite rules t(B-), (B+), (B++), (B?), (Bif=), (Bif‰)uY
(B&).
9 Soundness and Completeness of Constrained
Backwards Strand Semantics
The soundness and completeness proofs generalize the proofs in [Escobar et al(2014)].
Recall that the state in the constrained states of constrained backwards strand
semantics is a symbolic strand state, i.e., a state with variables. A state in the
forwards strand semantics is a ground strand state, i.e., a state without vari-
ables. The lifting relation defines the instantiation relation between symbolic
and ground states.
We define a symbolic state and a ground state as follows.
Definition 12 (Symbolic Strand State). Given a protocol P, a symbolic strand
state S of P is a term of the form:
S “ t :: r11 , . . . , rm1 :: ru11, . . . ui1´1 | ui1 , . . . , un1s &
...
:: r1k , . . . , rmk :: ru1k , . . . , uik´1 | uik , . . . , unks & SS
tw1PI, . . . , wmPI, w
1
1RI, . . . , w
1
m1RI, IKuu
where for each 1 ď j ď k, there exists a strand rm1j , . . .mij´1,mij , . . . ,mnj s P
PCstrSS and a substitution ρj : X Ñ TΣP pX q such that m1jρj “EP u1j , . . . ,
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mnjρj “EP unj , SS is a variable denoting a (possibly empty) set of strands,
and IK is a variable denoting a (possibly empty) set of intruder’s knowledge
facts.
Definition 13 (Ground Strand State). Given a protocol P, a ground strand
state s of P is a term without variables of the form:
s “ tru11, . . . ui1´1s & ¨ ¨ ¨& ru1k , . . . , uik´1s &
tw1PI, . . . , wmPIu u
where for each 1 ď j ď k, there exists a strand rm1j , . . .mij´1,mij , . . . ,mnj s P
PCstrSS and a substitution ρj : X Ñ TΣP such that m1jρj “EP u1j , . . . ,
mijρj “EP uij .
The lifting relation in [Escobar et al(2014)] is extended with constraints and
constrained messages. Note that the ui in the definition below can be sent
messages, received messages, or constrained messages.
Definition 14 (Lifting Relation). Given a protocol P, a constrained symbolic
strand state CstrS “ xS,Ψy and a ground strand state s, we say that s lifts to
CstrS, or that CstrS instantiates to s with a ground substitution θ : pVarpSq ´
tSS , IK uq Ñ TΣP , written CstrS ą
θ s iff
• for each strand :: r1, . . . , rm :: ru1, . . . ui´1 | ui, . . . , uns in S, there exists
a strand rv1, . . . vi´1s in s such that @1 ď j ď i´ 1, vj “EP ujθ.
• for each positive intruder fact wPI in S, there exists a positive intruder
fact w1PI in s such that w1 “EP wθ, and
• for each negative intruder fact wRI in S, there is no positive intruder fact
w1PI in s such that w1 “EP wθ.
• EP |ù Ψθ.
In the following we show the soundness and completeness of transitions in
constrained backwards strand semantics w.r.t. the constrained forwards strand
semantics by proving two lemmas stating the completeness and soundness of
one-step transition in the constrained backwards strand semantics w.r.t. the
constrained forwards strand semantics. The soundness and completeness re-
sult directly follows these two lemmas. In the proofs we consider only transi-
tion rules added in both semantics to deal with explicit choices, that is, rules
(Fif) Y (F?) Y (F?&) in the constrained forwards strand semantics and rules
t(B?), (Bif=), (Bif‰)u in the constrained backwards strand semantics. The proof
of the soundness and completeness of one-step transitions performed in the con-
strained backwards strand semantics using rules t(B-), (B+), (B++)u Y (B&)
w.r.t to one-step transitions performed in the constrained forwards strand se-
mantics using rules (F++)Y(F+)Y(F++&)Y(F+&)Y(F-)Y(F-&) is the same
as in [Escobar et al(2014)], since in these transitions no constraint is involved.
Note that although in [Escobar et al(2014)], Choice Variables were not defined
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CstrS
ąθ

CstrS 1oo
ąθ
1

s // s1
Figure 1: Lemma 3
explicitly, the proof extends to strands with choice variables naturally, since the
lifting relation between a ground state and a symbolic state does not need to
be changed to cover choice variables. Since the strand labels are irrelevant for
the result of this section, we will omit the strand labels to simplify the notation
from now on. Also, we include the fresh substitution in the substitutions and
do not separate the fresh substitutions explicitly.
Extending the proofs in [Escobar et al(2014)], we first prove how the lifting
of a ground state to a symbolic state induces a lifting of a forwards rewriting step
in the forwards semantics to a backwards narrowing step in the backwards se-
mantics, i.e., the completeness of one-step transition. The lemma below extends
the lifting lemma in [Escobar et al(2014)] to strands with constrained messages.
Lemma 3 (Lifting Lemma). Given a protocol P, two ground strand states s and
s1, a constrained symbolic strand state CstrS 1 “ xS1,Ψ1y and a substitution θ1 s.t.
s Ñ s1 and CstrS 1 ąθ
1
s1, then there exists a constrained symbolic strand state
CstrS “ xS,Ψy and a substitution θ s.t. CstrS ąθ s and either CstrS
µ
øCstrS 1
or CstrS “ CstrS 1.
The Lifting Lemma is illustrated by Figure 1.
Proof. As has been explained before, we only need to consider the new rules:
(Fif), (F?), (F?&). The proof in [Escobar et al(2014)] is structured by cases,
some of which having specific requirements on intruder knowledge, or involve
changes made to the intruder knowledge. Since all the new rules we are consid-
ering do not have specific requirements on the intruder knowledge, and do not
change the intruder knowledge either, the cases that we need to consider are
the following (cases e and f in the proof in [Escobar et al(2014)]), which involve
the appearance or non-appearance of certain strand(s):
e: There is a strand ru1, . . . , uj´1, uj, . . . , uns in PCstrSS , n ě 1, 1 ď j ď n,
and a substitution ρ such that ru1, . . . , uj´1, ujsρ is a strand in s
1 and
ru1, . . . , uj´1, uj | uj`1, . . . , unsρ is a strand in S
1θ1.
f: There is a strand ru1, . . . , uj´1, uj, . . . , uns in PCstrSS , n ě 1, 1 ď j ď n,
and a substitution ρ such that ru1, . . . , uj´1, ujsρ is a strand in s
1 but
ru1, . . . , uj´1, uj | uj`1, . . . , unsρ is not a strand in S
1θ1.
Now we consider for the forward rewrite rule application in the step sÑ s1.
• Given ground states s and s1 s.t. s Ñ s1 using a rule in set (Fif), then
there exists a ground substitution τ , variables SS’ and IK’, and strand
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ru1, . . . , uj´1,
tT,Numu, uj`1, . . . , uns in PCstrSS , such that s “ tSS
1τ&tIK 1τu&proqru1τ,
. . . , uj´1τ su, and s
1 “ tSS1τ&tIK 1τu&ru1τ, . . . , uj´1τ, tTτ,Numusu and
Tτ “EP true. Since there exists a substitution θ
1 s. t. CstrS 1 ąθ
1
s1, we
consider the following two cases:
– Case e) The strand appears in S1θ1. More specifically, ru1σ, . . . , uj´1σ,
tTσ,Numu | uj`1σ, . . . , unσs is a strand in S
1 s.t. σθ1 “EP τ . If the
constraint T is an equality constraint, since Tτ “EP Tσθ
1 “EP true,
and by the lifting relation, EP |ù Ψ
1θ1, rule (Bif=) can be applied
for the backwards narrowing CstrS 1
µ
ø CstrS , and CstrS ąθ s such
that µθ “EP θ
1. If the constraint T is a disequality constraint, since
Tτ “EP Tσθ
1 “EP true, and by the lifting relation, EP |ù Ψ
1θ1, we
have EP |ù Tσθ
1 ^ Ψ1θ1. Therefore, rule (Bif‰) can be applied for
the backwards narrowing, and CstrS ąθ s.
– Case f) The strand does not appear in S1θ1. Then θ1 makes S1 as a
valid symbolic strand state of s, i.e., S “ S1 and CstrS 1 ąθ
1
s.
• Given ground strand states s and s1 s.t. s Ñ s1 using a rule in set (F?),
then we consider the following two applicable cases:
– Case e) The strand appears in S1θ1 and thus we can perform a back-
wards narrowing step from CstrS 1 with rule (B?), i.e., CstrS 1❀ CstrS ,
and CstrS ąθ
1
s.
– Case f) The strand does not appear in S1θ1. Then θ1 makes CstrS 1
as a valid constraint symbolic state of s, i.e., CstrS “ CstrS 1 and
CstrS ąθ
1
s.
• Given states s and s1 s.t. s Ñ s1 using a rule in set (F?&), the proof is
similar with using a rule in the set (F?).
Theorem 2 below then follows straightforwardly.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Given a protocol P, two ground strand states s, s0,
a constrained symbolic strand state CstrS and a substitution θ s.t. (i) s0 is an
initial state, (ii) s0 Ñ
n s, and (iii) CstrS ąθ s. Then there exists a constrained
symbolic initial strand state CstrS 0, two substitutions µ and θ
1, and k ď n, s.t.
CstrS0
k
øµCstrS , and CstrS 0 ą
θ1 s0.
The Soundness Theorem from [Escobar et al(2014)] can also be extended
to constrained backwards and forwards strand semantics. We first show that
Lemma 2 in [Escobar et al(2014)], which states the soundness of one-step tran-
sition, still holds after extending to constrained states. The Soundness Theorem
then follows straightforwardly.
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CstrS
ąθ

CstrS 1oo o/
ąθ
1

s // s1
Figure 2: Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Given a protocol P, two constrained symbolic states CstrS “ xS,Ψy
and CstrS 1 “ xS1,Ψ1y, a ground strand state s and a ground substitution θ, if
CstrS
µ
øCstrS 1 and CstrS ąθ s, then there exists a ground strand state s1 and
a ground substitution θ1 such that sÑ s1, and CstrS 1 ąθ
1
s1.
Lemma 4 is illustrated by the Figure 2.
Proof. We only need to consider the new rules: rule (Bif=), (Bif‰) and (B?).
1) If CstrS
µ
øCstrS 1 using rule (B?), then there are associated rules in the sets
(F?) and (F?&).
2) If CstrS
µ
øCstrS 1 using rule (Bif=), there is a strand ru1σ, . . . , uj´1σ |
tpu “ vqσ,Numu, uj`1σ, . . . , unσs in S, ru1σ
1, . . . , uj´1σ
1, tpu “ vqσ1, Numu |
uj`1σ
1, . . . , unσ
1s in S1 s.t. σ “EP σ
1µ, Ψ “EP Ψ
1µ and uσ “EP vσ, where
ru1, . . . , uj´1, tu “ v,Numu, uj`1, . . . , uns is a strand in PCstrSS . Since CstrS ą
θ
s, there is a ground strand ru1σθ, . . . , uj´1σθs in s, and EP |ù Ψθ. Therefore,
EP |ù Ψ
1µθ and uσθ “EP vσθ. By rule (Fif), sÑ s
1, and CstrS 1 ąµθ s1.
If CstrS
µ
øCstrS 1 using rule (Bif‰), there is a strand ru1σ, . . . , uj´1σ |
tpu ‰ vqσ,Numu, uj`1σ, . . . , unσs in S , ru1σ
1, . . . , uj´1σ
1, tpu ‰ vqσ1, Numu |
uj`1σ
1, . . . , unσ
1s in S1 s.t. σ “EP σ
1µ and Ψ “EP Ψ
1µ ^ pu ‰ vqσ1µ, where
ru1, . . . , uj´1, tu ‰ v,Numu, uj`1, . . . , uns is a strand in PCstrSS . Since CstrS ą
θ
s, there is a ground strand ru1σθ, . . . , uj´1σθs in s, and EP |ù Ψθ. Therefore,
EP |ù Ψ
1µθ ^ pu ‰ vqσ1µθ. By rule (Fif), sÑ s1, and CstrS 1 ąµθ s1.
The Soundness Theorem below shows that the backwards symbolic reach-
ability analysis is sound with respect to the forwards rewriting-based strand
semantics.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Given a protocol P, two constrained symbolic strand
states CstrS0,CstrS
1, an initial ground strand state s0 and a substitution θ s.t.
(i) CstrS0 is a symbolic initial state, and (ii) CstrS0
˚
ø CstrS 1 , and (iii)
CstrS0 ą
θ s0. Then there exists a ground strand state s
1 and a substitution θ1,
s.t. (i) s0 Ñ
˚ s1, and (ii) CstrS 1 ąθ
1
s1.
The soundness and completeness results in Theorems 3 and 2 together with
the bisimulation proved in Theorem 1 show that the backwards symbolic reach-
ability analysis is sound and complete with respect to the process algebra se-
mantics.
Theorem 4 (Soundness). Given a protocol P, two constrained symbolic strand
states CstrS 0,CstrS, the initial FW-State Finit, a substitution θ, and the ini-
tial PA-State Pinit s.t. (i) CstrS 0 is a symbolic initial strand state, and (ii)
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CstrS0
˚
øµ CstrS , and (iii) CstrS 0 ą
θ Finit. Then there exists a FW-State
Fst such that CstrS ąθ
1
Fst, and therefore, there is a PA-State Pst such that
Pst H Fst.
Theorem 5 (Completeness). Given a protocol P, a PA-State Pst, a FW-State
Fst, a constrained symbolic strand state CstrS s.t. (i) Pst H Fst, (ii) CstrS ąθ
1
Fst. Then there is a backwards symbolic execution CstrS 0
˚
øµ CstrS s.t.
CstrS0 is a symbolic initial strand state as defined in Section 3, and CstrS 0 ą
θ
Finit.
10 Protocol Experiments
In this section we describe some experiments4 that we have performed on pro-
tocols with choice. We have fully integrated the process algebra syntax, and its
transformation into strands, and have developed new methods to specify attack
states using the process notation in the recent release of Maude-NPA 3.0 (see
[Escobar et al(2017)]).
10.1 Integration of the Protocol Process Algebra in Maude-
NPA
We have fully implemented the process algebra notation in Maude-NPA. Strands
represent each role behavior as a linear sequence of message outputs and inputs
but processes represent each role behavior as a possibly non-linear sequence of
message outputs and inputs. The honest principal specification is specified in
the process algebra syntax. In order for Maude-NPA to accept process spec-
ifications, we have replaced the section STRANDS-PROTOCOL from the protocol
template by a new section PROCESSES-PROTOCOL; see [Escobar et al(2017)] for
details. The intruder capabilities as well as the states generated by the tool still
use the strand syntax.
Attack patterns may be specified using the process algebra syntax, under
the label ATTACK-PROCESS, or strand syntax, under the label ATTACK-STATE. We
describe how they are specified in the process algebra syntax below. An attack
pattern describes a state consisting of zero or more processes that must have
executed, and zero or more terms in the intruder knowledge. It may also contain
never patterns, that is, descriptions of processes that must not be executed at
the time the state is reached. Never patterns can be used to reason about
authentication properties, e.g., can Alice execute an instance of the protocol,
apparently with Bob, without Bob executing an instance of the protocol with
Alice.
Note that processes in an attack pattern cannot contain explicit nondeter-
minism (?) or explicit deterministic choice (if), since one and only one behavior
is provided in an attack pattern. This is achieve by requiring that any constraint
c appearing in an attack pattern must be strongly irreducible, that is, it must
4Available at http://personales.upv.es/sanesro/Maude-NPA-choice/choice.html
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not only be irreducible, but for any irreducible substitution σ to the variables
of c, σc must be irreducible as well.
That is, imagine a process i the form
´pm1q . ` pm2q . if exp1 “ exp2 then ` pm3q else ` pm4q
where each of the expressions exp1 and exp2 can evaluate to yes or no depending
on the substitutions made to them.
Then in the attack pattern one must specify one and only one of the following
possibilities
´pm1q . ` pm2q . yes “ yes . ` pm3q
´pm1q . ` pm2q . yes ‰ no . ` pm4q
´pm1q . ` pm2q . no “ no . ` pm3q
´pm1q . ` pm2q . no ‰ yes . ` pm4q
Finally, never patterns must satisfy a stronger condition: the entire never
pattern must be strongly irreducible. This condition is inherited from the orig-
inal Maude-NPA.
10.2 Choice of Encryption Type
This protocol allows either public key encryption or shared key encryption to
be used by Alice to communicate with Bob. Alice initiates the conversation by
sending out a message containing the chosen encryption mode, then Bob replies
by sending an encrypted message containing his session key. The encryption
mode is chosen nondeterministically by Alice. Therefore, it exhibits an explicit
nondeterministic choice. Below we show the protocol description: the first one
reflects the case in which public key encryption (denoted by PubKey) is chosen.
1. AÑ B : A;B;PubKey
2. B Ñ A : pkpA,B;SKq
3. AÑ B : pkpB,A;SK;NAu
4. B Ñ A : pkpA,B;NAq
The second one reflects the case in which a shared key encryption (denoted by
SharedKey) is chosen.
1. AÑ B : A;B; SharedKey
2. B Ñ A : shkpkeypA,Bq, B;SKq
3. AÑ B : shkpkeypA,Bq, A;SK;NAq
4. B Ñ A : shkpkeypA,Bq, B;NAq
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Note that A and B are names of principals, SK denotes the session key gener-
ated by B, and NA denotes a nonce generated by A.
There are different ways of encoding this protocol as two process expressions.
We have chosen to treat the encryption mode as a choice variable which can be
either public key encryption or shared key encryption, and then the receiver will
perform an explicit deterministic choice depending on the value of this choice
variable. The process specification is as follows:
pInitq pp`pA? ; B? ; PubKeyq ¨ ´ppkpA?, B? ; SK qq
?
p`pA? ; B? ; SharedKeyq ¨ ´pepkeypA?, B?q, B? ; SK qq
pRespq ´ pA ; B ; TEncq ¨
if TEnc “ PubKey
then p`ppkpA,B ; skeypA,B , r 1qqq
else p`pepkeypA,Bq, B ; skeypA,B , r 1qqqq
We analyzed whether the intruder can learn the session key generated by
Bob, when either the public key encryption or shared key encryption is chosen,
assuming both principals are honest.
--- initiator accepts session key for shared key encryption and
--- intruder learns it
eq ATTACK-PROCESS(2)
= -(a ; b ; mode) .
(mode neq pubkey) .
+(she(key(a, b), skey(b,r))) .
-(she(key(a, b), skey(b,r) ; N)) .
+(she(key(a, b), N))
|| skey(b,r) inI
|| nil
[nonexec] .
--- initiator accepts session key for public key encryption and
--- intruder learns it
eq ATTACK-PROCESS(3)
= -(a ; b ; mode) .
(mode eq pubkey) .
+(pk(a, b ; skey(b, r))) .
-(pk(b, a ; skey(b,r) ; N)) .
+(pk(a, b ; N))
|| skey(b,r) inI
|| nil
[nonexec] .
For this property, Maude-NPA terminated without any attack being found
for any of the two attack states.
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10.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors
To evaluate our approach on protocols with explicit deterministic choices, we
have used a simple protocol which simulates the famous Rock-Paper-Scissors
game, in which Alice and Bob are the two players of the game. In this game,
Alice and Bob commit to each other their hand shapes, which are later on
revealed to each other after both players committed their hand shapes. The
result of the game is then agreed upon between the two players according to
the rule: rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper and paper beats rock. They
finish by verifying with each other that they both reached the same conclusion.
Thus, at the end of the protocol each party should know the outcome of the
game and whether or not the other party agrees to the outcome. This protocol
exhibits explicit deterministic choice, because the result of the game depends
on the evaluation of the committed hand shapes according to the game’s rule.
Note that this protocol also exhibits implicit nondeterministic choice, since the
hand shape of the players are chosen by the players during the game.
The protocol proceeds as follows. First, both initiator and responder choose
their hand shapes and send them to each other using a secure commitment
scheme. Next, they both send each other the nonces that are necessary to
open the commitments. Each of them then compares the two hand shapes
and decides if the initiator wins, the responder wins, or there is a tie. The
initiator then sends the responder the outcome. When the responder receives
the initiator’s verdict, it compares it against its own. It responds with “finished”
if it agrees with the initiator and “cheater” if it doesn’t. All messages are signed
and encrypted, and the initiator’s and responder’s nonces are included in the
messages concerning the outcome of the game. The actual messages sent and
choices made are described in more detail below.
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1. AÑ B : pkpB, signpA, commitpNA, XAqqq
2. B Ñ A : pkpA, signpB, commitpNB, XBqqq
3. AÑ B : pkpB, signpA,NAqq
4. B Ñ A : pkpA, signpB,NBqq
5. if pXA beats XBq
then R “Win
else if pXB beats XAq
then R “ Lose
else if pXB “ XAq
then R “ T ie
else nilP
6. AÑ B : pkpB, signpA,NA;NB;Rqq
7. if pR “Win&XA beats XBq
or pR “ Lose & XB beats XAq
or pR “ T ie & XA “ XBq
then B Ñ A : pkpA, signpB,NA;NB; finished qq
else B Ñ A : pkpA, signpB,NA;NB; cheater qq
One interesting feature of the Rock-Scissors-Paper protocol, is that, in order
to verify that the commitment has been opened successfully, i.e., that the nonce
received is the nonce used to create the commitment, one must verify that the
result of opening it is well-typed, i.e., that it is equal to “rock”, “scissors”, or
“paper”. This can be done via the evaluation of predicates. First, we create
a sort Item and declare the constants “rock”, “scissors”, and “paper” to be of
sort Item. Then we create a variable X : Item of sort Item. We then define a
predicate item? such that item?X : Item evaluates to true. Since only terms
of sort Item can be unified with X : Item, this predicate can be used to check
whether or not a term is of sort Item. The process specification for the initiator
and the responder is as follows.
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pInitiatorq ` ppkpB, sigpA, compnpA, rq, XAqqqq .
´ ppkpA, sigpB,ComXBqqq .
` ppkpB, sigpA, npA, rqqqq .
´ ppkpA, sigpB,NBqqq .
pif ppitem? openpNB,ComXBqq eq okq
then if ppXA beats openpNB,ComXBqq eq okq
then ` ppkpB, sigpA, npA, rq ; winqqq
else if ppopenpNB,ComXBq beats XAq eq okq
then ` ppkpB, sigpA, npA, rq ; loseqqq
else ` ppkpB, sigpA, npA, rq ; tieqqq
else nilP q .
´ ppkpA, sigpB, npA, rq;NBqq ; S:Statusq
pResponderq ´ ppkpB, sigpA,ComXAqqq .
` ppkpA, sigpB, compnpB, rq, XBqqqq .
´ ppkpB, sigpA,NAqqq .
` ppkpA, sigpB, npB, rqqqq .
´ ppkpB, sigpA,NA;Rqqq .
pif ppitem? openpNA,ComXAqq eq okq then
if pR eq winq
then if ppopenpNA,ComXAq beats XBq eq okq
then ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; finishedq
else ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; cheaterq
else if pR eq loseq
then if ppXB beats openpNA,ComXAqq eq okq
then ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; finishedq
else ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; cheaterq
else if pR eq tieq
then if pXB eq openpNA,ComXAqq
then ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; finishedq
else ` ppkpA, sigpB,NA;npB, rqqq ; cheaterq
else nilP
else nilP q
We first tried to see whether the protocol can simulate the game successfully,
so we asked for different scenarios in which the player Alice or Bob can win in
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a round of the game. Maude-NPA was able to generate the expected scenarios,
and it did not generate any others. We then gave Maude-NPA a secrecy at-
tack state, in which the intruder, playing the role of initiator against an honest
responder, attempts to guess its nonce before the responder receives its com-
mitment.
eq ATTACK-PROCESS(1) =
-(pk(b,sig(i, ComXA:ComMsg))) .
+(pk(i,sig(b, com(n(b, r:Fresh), XB:Item)))) .
-(pk(b,sig(i, NA:Nonce)))
|| n(b, r:Fresh) inI
|| nil
[nonexec] .
Finally we specified an authentication attack state in which we asked if a
responder could complete a session with an honest initiator with the conclusion
that the initiator had carried out its rule faithfully, without that actually having
happened.
eq ATTACK-PROCESS(2) =
-(pk(b, sig(a, ComXA))) .
+(pk(a, sig(b, com(n(b,r), XB)))) .
-(pk(b, sig(a, NA))) .
+(pk(a, sig(b, n(b, r)))) .
-(pk(b, sig(a, NA ; win))) .
((item? open(NA, ComXA)) eq ok) .
(win eq win) .
((open(NA, ComXA) beats XB) eq ok) .
+(pk(a, sig(b, NA ; n(b,r))) ; finished)
|| empty
|| never(
+(pk(b, sig(a, ComXA))) .
-(pk(a, sig(b, com(n(b,r), XB)))) .
+(pk(b, sig(a, NA))) .
-(pk(a, sig(b, n(b,r)))) .
(ok eq ok) .
(ok eq ok) .
+(pk(b, sig(a, NA ; win))) .
-(pk(a, sig(b, NA ; n(b,r))) ; finished)
|| empty
)
[nonexec] .
For both of these attack states Maude-NPA finished its search without find-
ing any attacks.
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10.4 TLS
In Section 1.3 we introduced a simplified version of the handshake protocol
in TLS 1.3 [Rescorla(2016)]. Even this simplified version produced a very large
search space, because of the long list of messages and the concurrent interactions
of a big amount of choices. We are however able to check the correctness of our
specification by producing legal executions in Maude-NPA. Unlike TLS 1.3,
we intentionally introduced a “downgrade attack” in our version in which the
attacker can trick the principals into using a weaker crypto system. However,
we have not yet been able to produce this attack because of the very deep and
wide analysis tree (i.e., long reachability sequences with many branches) that is
produced. We are currently investigating more efficient ways of managing list
processing.
11 Related Work
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a considerable amount of work
on adding choice to the strand space model that involves embedding it into other
formal systems, including event-based models for concurrency [Crazzolara and Winskel(2002)],
Petri nets [Fro¨schle(2009)], or multi-set rewriting [Cervesato et al(2000)]. Craz-
zolara and Winskel model nondeterministic choice as a form of composition,
where a conflict relation is defined between possible child strands so that the
parent can compose with only one potential child. In [Fro¨schle(2009)] Fro¨schle
uses a Petri net model to add branching to strand space bundles, which repre-
sent the concurrent execution of strand space roles. Note that we have taken the
opposite approach of representing bundles as traces of non-branching strands,
where a different trace is generated for each choice taken. Although this re-
sults in more bundles during forward execution, it makes little difference in
backwards execution, and is more straightforward to implement in an already
existing analysis tool.
We also note that deterministic choice has been included in the applied pi
calculus for cryptographic protocols [Abadi and Fournet(2001)], another widely
used formal model, based on Milner’s pi calculus [Milner(1999)]. The applied
pi calculus includes the rule if M “ N then P else Q, where P and Q are
terms. This is similar to our syntax for deterministic choice. However our long-
term plan is to add other types or predicates as well (e.g., M subsumes N) ;
indeed our approach extends to any type of predicate that can be evaluated on
a ground state. Although the applied pi calculus in its original form does not
include nondeterministic choice, both nondeterministic and probabilistic choice
have been added in subsequent work [Goubault-Larrecq et al(2007)].
In addition, Olarte and Valencia show in [Olarte and Valencia(2008)] how a
cryptographic protocol modeling language can be expressed in their universal
timed concurrent constraint programming (utcc) model, a framework that ex-
tends the timed concurrent constraint programming model to express mobility.
The language does not support choice, but utcc does. It seems that it would not
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be difficult to extend the language to incorporate the utcc choice mechanisms.
The Tamarin protocol analysis tool [Meier et al(2013)] includes deterministic
branching, which was used extensively in the analysis of TLS 1.3 [Cremers et al(2016)].
In particular, it includes an optimization for roles of the form P.pif T then Q else Rq.S;
when backwards search is used, it is sometimes possible to capture such an ex-
ecution in terms of just one strand until the conditional is encountered, thus
reducing the state space. Our approach produces two strands, but since the
process algebra semantics makes it easy to tell whether or not R behaves “es-
sentially” the same no matter if P or Q is chosen, we believe that we have a
pathway for including such a feature if desired.
12 Conclusions
We have provided an extension to the strand space model that allows for both
deterministic and nondeterministic choice, together with an operational seman-
tics for choice in strand spaces that not only provides a formal foundation for
choice, but allows us to implement it directly in the Maude-NPA cryptographic
protocol analysis tool. In particular, we have applied Maude-NPA to several
protocols that rely on choice in order to validate our approach.
This work not only provides a choice extension to strand spaces, but ex-
tends them in other ways as well. First of all, it provides a process algebra for
strand spaces. This potentially allows us to relate the strand space model to
other formal systems (e.g., the applied pi calculus [Abadi(2001)]) giving a better
understanding of how it compares with other formal models. In addition, the
process algebra semantics provides a new specification language for Maude-NPA
that we believe is more natural for users than the current strand-space language.
Another contribution of this work is that it provides a means for evaluat-
ing both equality and disequality predicates in the strand space model and in
Maude-NPA. This allows us to implement features such as type checking in
Maude-NPA, via predicates such as foocheckpX q, where foocheckp0 : Fooq “ tt,
that is, foocheckpX q succeeds only if X is of sort Foo. This proved to be very
helpful, for example, in our specification of the Rock-Scissors-Paper protocol
as we described earlier. We believe the expressiveness of Maude-NPA can be
further increased at little cost by extending the types of predicates that can
be evaluated, e.g., by including predicates for subsumption and their negations.
This is another subject for further investigation.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Since Pinit Ñnil Pinit and Finit Ñnil Finit, therefore, pPinit, Finitq P H.
We then prove that: for all PA-State Pstn, and FW-State Fstn, if pPstn,Fstnq
P H, and there exists a PA-State Pstn`1 such that Pstn Ña Pstn`1, then there
exists a FW-State Fstn`1 such that Fstn Ña Fstn`1 and pPstn`1,Fstn`1q P H..
If pPstn,Fstnq P H, by definition of the relation H, there exists a label sequence
α s.t. Pinit Ñα Pstn and Finit Ñα Fstn. Suppose there exists state Pstn`1
such that Pstn Ña Pstn`1. We prove by case analysis on label a that there
exists Fstn`1 such that Fstn Ña Fstn`1. The fact that pPstn`1,Fstn`1q P H
then follows this by the definition of relation H.
In the rest of this proof,
ÝÑ
L ,
ÝÑ
L1 and
ÝÑ
L2 denote lists of messages, M,M
1
and m denote messages, P,Q and R denote processes, PS denotes a process
configuration, SS denotes a set of constrained protocol strands, IK and IK 1
denote the set of messages in the intruder’s knowledge.
1) a “ pro, i, j,`m, 0q : if j ą 1, according to the semantics, Pstn Ña Pstn`1
by applying rule (PA++), the state Pstn is of the form tpro, i, jq p`M ¨
P q & PS | tIKuu s.t. there exists a ground substitution σ binding the
choice variables in M and m “ Mσ, the state Pstn`1 “ tpro, i, j `
1q Pσ & PS | tm P I, IKuu and mPI R IK. Since Pstn H Fstn, by
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Lemmas 1 and 2, Fstn is of the form tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s & SS & tIKuu s.t.
pro, i, jq p`M ¨ P q HLP Str pro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s. Let proq r
ÝÑ
L1,
ÝÑ
L2s be a constrained
strand in PCstrSS s.t. there exists a ground substituion θ s.t.
ÝÑ
L1ρro,iθ “
ÝÑ
L . By the definition of relation HLP Str and mapping toCstrSS, the
first message of
ÝÑ
L2 is `M
1, s.t. M 1ρro,iθ “ M . Then since Mσ “ m and
mPI R IK, the rule (F++) can be applied for the rewrite Fstn Ña Fstn`1,
where Fstn`1 “ tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L ,`ms & SS & tmPI, IKuu.
If j “ 1, Pstn Ña Pstn`1 by applying rule (PA&), there exists a pro-
cess proq p`M ¨P q in PPA and a ground substitution σ s.t. Mρro,iσ “ m.
Since toCstrSSpPPAq “ PCstrSS , by the definition of toCstrSS, for all
strands of role ro in PCstrSS , the first message is `M . Without loss
of generality, let Pstn be tPS | tIKuu, and Fstn be tSS & tIK
1uu. Since
the rule (PA&) can be applied, mPI R IK. By Lemma 2, IK “ IK 1.
Moreover, by Lemma 1, MaxStrIdpSS, roq “ MaxProcIdpPS, roq, and
since MaxProcIdpPS, roq ` 1 “ i, by applying the rule (F++&) we get
Fstn Ña Fstn`1.
2) a “ pro, i, j,Mσ, 0q: similar to case 1.
3) a “ pro, i, j,´m, 0q: if j ą 1, according to the semantics, Pstn Ña
Pstn`1 by applying rule (PA-), Pstn is of the form tpro, i, jq p´M ¨
P q & PS | tmPI, IKuu s.t. m “EP Mσ for some ground substitu-
tion σ and Pstn`1 “ tpro, i, j ` 1q Pσ & PS | tmPI, IKuu. Since
Pstn H Fstn, by Lemmas 1 and 2, Fstn “ tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s & SS & tmPI, IKuu
s.t. pro, i, jq p´M ¨ P q HLP Str proq r
ÝÑ
L s. Let proq r
ÝÑ
L1,
ÝÑ
L2s P PCstrSS s.t.
there exists a ground substitution θ s.t.
ÝÑ
L1ρro,iθ “
ÝÑ
L , then by definition
of HLP Str and toCstrSS, the first message of
ÝÑ
L2 is ´M
1 s.t. M 1ρro,iθ “
M . Since m “EP Mσ, rule (F-) can be applied to get the transition
Fstn Ña Fstn`1, where Fstn`1 “ tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L ,´ms & SS & tmPI, IKuu.
If j “ 1, Pstn Ña Pstn`1 by applying rule (PA&), there exists a
process proq p´M ¨P q in PPA and a ground substitution σ s.t. Mρro,iσ “
m. Without loss of generality, let Pstn be tPS | tIKuu. Then mPI P
IK. Since toCstrSSpPPAq “ PCstrSS , by the definition of toCstrSS, for
all strands of role ro in PCstrSS , the first message is ´M . By Lemma
2, mPI is in the intruder knowledge of Fstn. Moreover, by Lemma 1,
MaxStrIdpSS, roq “ MaxProcIdpPS, roq, and since MaxProcIdpPS, roq `
1 “ i, by applying the rule (F-&) we get Fstn Ña Fstn`1.
4) a “ pro, i, j, T, 1q: according to the transition rules, Pstn Ña Pstn`1 by
applying rule (PAif1). Therefore Pstn is of the form tpro, i, jq ppif c then P elseQq ¨
Rq & PS | tIKuu, Pstn`1 “ tpro, i, j`1q pP ¨Rq & PS | tIKuu and c “EP
true. Since Fstn H Pstn, by Lemma 1, Fstn “ tproq r
ÝÑ
L s & SS & tIK 1uu
s.t. pro, i, jq ppif c then P else Qq ¨ Rq HLP Str pro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s. By the def-
inition of the relation HLP Str and the mapping toCstrSS, there exists
proq r
ÝÑ
L1, tC, 1u,
ÝÑ
L2s P PCstrSS and a ground substitution θ s.t.
ÝÑ
L “
ÝÑ
L1ρro,iθ, and Cρro,iθ “ c. Since c “EP true, the rule (Fif) can be
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applied for the rewrite Fstn Ña Fstn`1, where Fstn`1 “ ttproq r
ÝÑ
L ,
tt, 1us & SS & tIK 1uu
5) a “ pro, i, j, T, 2q: similar to case 4.
6) a “ pro, i, j, ?, 1q: if j ą 1, Pstn Ña Pstn`1 by applying rule (PA?1).
Therefore Pstn is of the form tpro, i, jq ppP ? Qq ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu and
Pstn`1 “ tpro, i, j ` 1q pP ¨ Rq & PS | tIKuu. Since Fstn H Pstn, by
Lemma 1, Fstn “ tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s & SS & tIK 1uu s.t. pro, i, jq ppP ? Qq ¨
Rq HLP Str pro, iq r
ÝÑ
L s. By the definition of HLP Str and toCstrSS, there
is a strand pro, iq r
ÝÑ
L1, t?, 1u,
ÝÑ
L2s P PCstrSS s.t.
ÝÑ
L “
ÝÑ
L1θ. Therefore,
rule (F?) can be applied for the rewrite Fstn Ña Fstn`1, and Fstn`1 “
tpro, iq r
ÝÑ
L , t?, 1us & SS & tIK 1uu.
If j “ 1, Pstn Ña Pstn`1 by applying rule (PA&). Therefore, there
exists a process proq ppP ? Qq¨Rq in PPA. Since toCstrSSpPPAq “ PCstrSS ,
by the definition of toCstrSS, there is a strand of role ro whose first mes-
sage is p?, 1q in PCstrSS . Moreover, by Lemma 1, MaxStrIdpSS, roq “
MaxProcIdpPS, roq, and since MaxProcIdpPS, roq`1 “ i, by applying the
rule (F?&) we get Fstn Ña Fstn`1.
7) a “ pro, i, j, ?, 2q similar to case 6.
Similarly, we can prove that for all PA-State Pstn, and FW-State Fstn, if
pPstn,Fstnq P H, and there exists a FW-State Fstn`1 such that Fstn Ña
Fstn`1, then there exists a PA-State Pstn`1 such that Pstn Ña Pstn`1 and
pPstn`1,Fstn`1q P H
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